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Article
When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal
Interests and the Eleventh Amendment
by
ANN ALTHOUSE*
Legal fiction permeates eleventh amendment analysis. Ex Parte
Young, I which the Supreme Court openly calls a fiction, enables citizens,
kept from suing states by the eleventh amendment, to sue state officials
and achieve virtually the same result, at least with respect to those claims
the Court decides fall within the scope of Young. The other major fiction
is contained in Hans v. Louisiana. 2 Hans, which has managed to avoid
the stigmatizing label "fiction," takes constitutional language that refers
only to cases brought against a state by a citizen of another state or a
foreign country and finds that it bars cases brought by citizens against
their own states.3 Both the majority that supports Hans and the minority
that would overrule it view the issue it presents as a matter to be deter-
mined by historical interpretation. 4 Despite the difficulty of finding an
original meaning for the amendment, a difficulty intensified by the likeli-
hood that the relevant constitutional provision is not the amendment at
all but Article III, 5 the entire Court, as well as most commentators, 6
continues to comb the historical record attempting to understand
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to
thank the Smongeski Fund and the University of Wisconsin Foundation for the support I have
received to write this Article, my colleagues Gordon Baldwin and Bill Foster for their com-
ments on an earlier draft, and Margaret DeWind and John Blazek for their research assistance.
1. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
3. Id. at 18-20.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 7-26.
5. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection ofEconomic Inter-
ests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 324, 328-29 (1985). The eleventh amendment is phrased,
not as an affirmative command, grant of power, or direct prohibition, but as a rule of construc-
tion referring to the definition of "judicial Power" set forth in Article III of the Constitution.
The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
[1123]
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whether a ban on citizen suits against their own states should lie at the
heart of the amendment's meaning.
This Article will take a different approach. In reviewing what the
Court has done with eleventh amendment interpretation, particularly
some of its recent candid statements, this Article will show that the
Court makes its difficult decisions in response to what it perceives as the
federal interest at stake. Whether the Court endorses a legal fiction, like
Ex Parte Young, or sifts the historical evidence and claims to find the
intent of the framers of the eleventh amendment, the Court defines fed-
eral court jurisdiction according to its conception of federal interest.
This Article does not contend that federal interest analysis can accu-
rately predict results, for the justices' assessments of federal interest will
vary. An interest strong enough to motivate one Justice to extend federal
jurisdiction will seem insufficient to another. Instead, this Article identi-
fies a process underlying the Court's decisionmaking and engages in an
eleventh amendment analysis based on federal interests, without resort-
ing to the legal fictions and unanswerable questions of historical intent
that currently dominate the written opinions.
Section I of the Article details the existing debate over Hans, show-
ing the conflicting historical interpretations and how the members of the
Court have justified their interpretations with appeals to present day fed-
eral interests. Section II explores several areas of eleventh amendment
doctrine, highlighting the federal interest analysis that has gone on thus
far and how courts might use it in the future. This section also notes
how the complex doctrine that has evolved under Hans has avoided
Hans' harsh potential for keeping important federal cases out of federal
court. Thus, the difficult and self-contradictory doctrine that would
prompt some to overrule Hans actually has led a majority of the Court to
tolerate Hans and the disturbing complexity it brings to the law.
Recognizing that the Court may choose not to overrule the century-
old precedent and its cumbrous doctrinal baggage in the near future, this
Article considers a less drastic improvement. Section III draws on many
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
6. A wealth of scholarship addresses the history relevant to eleventh amendment analy-
sis, including: J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987); Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
515 (1978); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Con-
struction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Im-
munity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Nowak, The Scope of Congres-
sional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
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judicial decisions and the powers of Congress to abrogate the eleventh
amendment and suggests that the central distinction in eleventh amend-
ment law should be between cases arising under the federal Constitution
and cases arising under nonconstitutional law. Finally, Section IV com-
pares the effects of restructuring current doctrine using a constitutional-
nonconstitutional distinction with the effect of overruling Hans. Ulti-
mately, the two proposed changes do not differ as much as one might
expect, though the former retains much of the basic framework of ex-
isting doctrine. The choice between these two changes should depend on
one's understanding of Congress' ability to protect the interests of the
states and the meaning of congressional silence on the question of state
immunity.
I. Overturning Hans v. Louisiana: The Historical and the
Nonhistorical Arguments
A. Historical Interpretation
In recent years, a minority of the Supreme Court, led by Justice
Brennan, has gone to war against Hans v. Louisiana, 7 the case that lays
the groundwork for modem eleventh amendment interpretation. The
language of the eleventh amendment refers only to suits brought against
a state by a citizen of another state (or a foreign state).8 In Hans the
Court made the great extraliteral leap of finding eleventh amendment
immunity when citizens sue their own states.9 The Court reasoned that
Congress had tailored the amendment to the narrow purpose of overrul-
ing the case of Chisholm v. Georgia,'l0 which held that Article III author-
ized suits against a state by citizens of another state." Under this
7. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
8. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
9. Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-17.
10. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The amendment refers to both citizen-state diversity and
alien-state diversity though the plaintiff in Chisholm was a South Carolina citizen. The fact
that the language of the amendment covers cases broader than the one presented in Chisholm
may be because the Chisholm plaintiff brought the claim on behalf of a British citizen. See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248, 281 n.32 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
11. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12. The judicial power described in Article III is not a self-execut-
ing grant of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of lower federal courts depends upon statutory
grants of jurisdiction. This being the case, Congress could simply have withdrawn the offend-
ing jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448
(1850). Why then did Congress go to the trouble of introducing a constitutional amendment?
It may have chosen this route in order to expunge the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in
suits in which a state is a party. See Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause:
Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
189, 203 n.50 (1981). Indeed, Chisholm was just such a Supreme Court original jurisdiction
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interpretation, the amendment takes the form of a rule of construction
aimed at the definition of "judicial power" in Article III. Thus, it tells
the Court, which in Chisholm had misconstrued Article III, how to go
about proper construction in the Chisholm context. Confronted with a
different context, the Hans Court would construe Article III properly
and, in accordance with the intent of the framers of Article 111,12 respect
suit. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is created by Article III and Congress may restrict its
appellate jurisdiction under the exceptions and regulations clause. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 2. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868). Congress cannot, how-
ever, change the Court's original jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174-75 (1803). In cases in which the state is a party, like Chisholm, the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is original, not appellate. Moreover, at the time of Chisholm, the Supreme Court
had not yet defined the extent of congressional power over lower federal court jurisdiction.
Because Chisholm spoke in terms of the Constitution's power to authorize suit, rather than
merely interpreting the statute granting jurisdiction, Congress responded on a constitutional
level. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 430.
12. See Hans, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In detailing the relevant intent, the Court set out the
following three quotations, upon which later cases and commentary also have relied heavily.
See supra note 6. First, James Madison, addressing the Virginia Convention, stated,
[The Supreme Court's] jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of
another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power
of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation [the Clause] can have,
is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought
before the federal court.... It appears to me that this [clause] can have no operation
but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state
should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it.
3 ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (2d ed. 1861) quoted in Hans, 134 U.S. at 14. John Marshall,
also addressing the Virginia Convention, said,
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal
court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the
legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this
construction is warranted by the words. . . . I see a difficulty in making a state
defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.
Id. at 555-56, quoted in Hans, 134 U.S. at 14. Finally, Alexander Hamilton, addressing primar-
ily the New York Convention in The Federalist, wrote,
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an indi-
vidual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of man-
kind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by
the government of every state in the union .... [T]here is no colour to pretend that
the state governments, would by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privi-
lege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that
which flows from the obligations of good faith .... To what purpose would it be to
authori[z]e suits against states, for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be
enforced? It is evident that it could not be done without waging war against the
contracting state; and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in
destruction of a pre-existing right of the state governments, a power which would
involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
[Vol. 40
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sovereign immunity. After Hans, the eleventh amendment became a gen-
eral direction to the federal courts to read sovereign immunity between
the lines of Article III in all instances.I 3 As memorably characterized by
Professors Hart and Sacks, the amendment took on the qualities of a
judicial precedent, from which the Court would derive principles that
would serve as a basis for further doctrinal exposition.' 4
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, has attacked Hans in virtually every eleventh amendment case that
the Court has decided in recent years. I5 He argues that Article III was
never intended to preserve the states' sovereign immunity in cases arising
under federal law or, indeed, in any categories of Article III judicial
power other than that encountered in Chisholm itself: the diversity pro-
vision for federal jurisdiction in suits between a state and a citizen of
another state. According to Justice Brennan, the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution were concerned only with whether states could be sued
for their Revolutionary War debts, cases that they did not see as arising
under federal law. Thus, war debt cases were thought susceptible to fed-
eral jurisdiction only if the plaintiff were a citizen of another state or a
foreign state attempting to use the provision for diversity jurisdiction.16
Justice Brennan interprets all of the historical evidence of the intent of
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution marshalled by the Hans
Court to support its broad proposition 7 as limited to diversity-based
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, 548-49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original), quoted in Hans,
134 U.S. at 13.
13. It is more sensible, then, to cite Article III as the source of the states' constitutional
immunity from suit in federal court. See Currie, supra note 5, at 328-29. But since the
Supreme Court refers to the eleventh amendment this Article follows that convention. See,
e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). But see Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) ("the fundamental principle of sovereign
immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III").
14. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 806-07 (10th ed. 1958).
15. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Papasan v. Alain, 478 U.S. 265, 293 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4667 (1989) (Justice Brennan writing for a plurality that
finds Congress has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the commerce clause and
not reaching the Hans issue).
16. See 4tascadero, 473 U.S. at 248, 262.
17. See supra note 12. These same few pieces of information are recounted repeatedly.
They are the most significant historical evidence of original intent because they are the fram-
ers' response to criticisms by those who would determine the fate of the Constitution. If un-
met, these attacks could have defeated ratification. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949-51;
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248, 263-80; Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1934). In a
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suits. 8 Indeed, Chisholm, which was based on a common law contract
claim, was just such a suit and threatened the precise injury that the
framers feared. 19 Because the states surrendered a portion of their sover-
conclusion that has influenced a majority of the Supreme Court, one prominent historian has
written,
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate
its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active de-
bate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such
right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal
Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the
existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted.
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1935), quoted in
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2951 n.13.
18. Justice Brennan has emphasized that the sovereign immunity defense to these "state
law" claims predated the Constitution and limited judicial remedies available to the states'
creditors (who entered into their agreements with the states subject to these known limitations
and stood to gain a windfall if suit in federal court became possible). See Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 262-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has not explained why sovereign immu-
nity would not, as a matter of common law (and not constitutional law), limit the availability
of remedies even in federal question suits against the states. See Employees of the Dep't. of
Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 75 (1988) (state law and federal common law basis
for sovereign immunity would survive overruling Hans). He also fails to acknowledge that in a
pre-Erie v. Tompkins world, the applicable law would have been considered simply common
law and not specifically state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overrul-
ing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 9 (1841)). Presumably, the common law applied by the courts,
federal or state, could have accommodated the principle of sovereign immunity. Justice Bren-
nan has indicated that the states were concerned about losing control over the use of their own
law, especially when federal courts applied state law to reach results that they did not intend.
Cf. Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1485, 1522-23 (1987) (state has an ongoing interest in how the law is applied, which is an
aspect of its power to legislate). But this argument loses some force if the law in question is not
regarded as state law at all. See Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1391-95 (1989). At the time of the states' de-
bates over ratification of the Constitution, some feared that the citizen-state diversity clause
would make the states suable for their debts in federal courts even though state courts would
find the state immune. Some supporters of ratification indicated that the defense of sovereign
immunity would indeed be available in federal court. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 263-73
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, suit against a state was certainly not "inconceivable"
to those debating the merits of the Constitution; in fact, some of its supporters openly favored
making the states suable for their debts in federal court. Id. at 279-80.
19. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 281. In Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina brought an
action in assumpsit seeking payment for military goods sold to Georgia in 1777. Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). One problem with this attempt to limit the meaning of
the eleventh amendment to diversity-based suits is that Hans itself was a suit to enforce debts
against the state involving Civil War debt. Federal question jurisdiction, which would have
opened the federal courts to citizens suing their own states, was premised on a violation of the
contract clause. Professor Field has argued that the eleventh amendment could nevertheless
be confined to the narrow purpose of protecting the states from suits for these debts if the
substantive law of the contract clause were interpreted to preclude private rights of action.
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eignty to the substantive lawmaking power granted to Congress in Arti-
cle I, he argues, sovereign immunity does not exist with respect to cases
arising under federal law. 20 Moreover, there is no reason to think that
any intent with respect to federal question cases existed at the time of the
states' acceptance of either Article III or the eleventh amendment. First,
there was no statutory grant of general federal question jurisdiction at
the time of the passage of the eleventh amendment. 21 Second, the kinds
of claims that would later account for most of the federal question litiga-
tion against the states grew out of the fourteenth amendment, 22 which
was ratified by the states more than half a century after the eleventh
amendment.
A five member majority of the Court, unable to find in the historical
evidence any explicit suggestion of the limitation urged by the minority,
has repeatedly rebuffed this attack and affirmed the rationale of Hans.23
This five member majority at one time consisted of Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.24 A short inter-
val of doubt about the security of the Hans precedent followed the resig-
nations of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.25 This Term,
however, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company,26 Justices Scalia and
Under this interpretation, the contract clause would serve only as a defense to private actions.
See Field, supra note 6, at 1266.
20. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 279-80. According to Justice Brennan, Justice Iredell, who
dissented in Chisholm, expressly avoided articulating an opinion as to the existence of sover-
eign immunity in a federal question case. Id. at 283 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449). Justice
Powell, writing for the majority in Welch, refers to Justice Iredell's statement that "it may not
be improper to intimate that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the
Constitution], which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against the State
for the recovery of money." Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2951 n.16. (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449)
(emphasis supplied by Justice Powell).
21. The eleventh amendment was ratified in 1789. For a discussion of Congress' sparing
use of the "arising under" clause of Article III, section 2, and the post-Civil War expansion of
federal jurisdiction including the general federal question grant in the 1875 Judiciary Act, see
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 960-66 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
There was general federal jurisdiction very briefly at an earlier point, though after the ratifica-
tion of the eleventh amendment. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
22. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 1381.
23. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2943.
24. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
25. Justice Scalia was a member of the Welch Court, 107 S. Ct at 2958 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), but unlike the other members of the Court, he declined to state his position on the
correctness of Hans. For a discussion of his participation in that case, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 261-64. Prior to Union Gas, Justice Kennedy had not participated in a Supreme
Court case raising the question.
26. 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Joining Justice Scalia's opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, as well as
Justice Kennedy. On the issue of congressional power to abrogate, Justice White voted with
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Kennedy declared their support for Hans, thus giving rise to a new five-
member majority favoring a pervasive eleventh amendment immunity
that covers suits by citizens as well as noncitizens and federal question as
well as state law claims.
The Court's disagreement over the significance of the ambiguous
historical evidence reveals one of the essential problems with searching
for original intent. In the words of Professor Powell:
Where the credibility of conflicting interpretations of the historical evi-
dence is in equipoise, the prudent constitutional interpreter might well
conclude that history in that instance is too inconclusive to be of even
the limited assistance it sometimes affords. The originalist, however, if
he is incautious, may make the mistake of choosing the historical posi-
tion that accords with his personal or political preferences, and build
his normative arguments upon it.... If the originalist does not justify
historically his choice among the historical options, his arguments will
be completely unpersuasive because they are logically defective: with-
out historical justification for his choice, his "use" of history is nothing
but a normative conclusion decorated with quotations from the
founders.27
In the area of the eleventh amendment, the Court reveals the very
problem that Professor Powell describes. The two sides have cogently set
out their two historical interpretations. Neither side is moved by the
other's historical arguments, because the historical evidence is nebulous
enough that either position can be maintained. One must therefore
doubt that the Justices have based their positions on any marginal superi-
ority of one historical interpretation over the other.
In fact, the historical evidence is particularly unconvincing because
the framers and ratifiers of Article III and the eleventh amendment never
focused on the issue presented today. 28 If we could resurrect them and
pose the issue, outlining in detail the theories of interpretation that have
evolved since Hans, it is likely they would be as perplexed as the average
the majority, which found discussion of the Hans issue unnecessary. See id. at 4667, 4669
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since Justice White has long adhered to
the position that Hans should not be overruled, see, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941; Atascadero,
473 U.S. 234, the five member majority remains intact.
27. Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 689 (1987) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original). See also J. ORTH, supra note 6, at 159 ("judges in search of a ratio
decidendi do not make good historians").
28. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 1169 ("Chisholm was an assumpsit action.
In drafting a provision to overrule it, the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment gave little if
any explicit consideration to the question of an unconsenting state's liability under federal
law."). Because state immunity can flow from either the amendment or Article III, an added
level of complexity exists. When we decide to search for the ever-elusive original intent, the
need to chase down two different groups of "framers and ratifiers" makes our task even more
difficult.
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law student hearing the theories for the first time.29 If asked to take a
position, they would, I suspect, choose the "position that accords with
[their] personal and political preferences.13 0 But it is not even possible to
reconstruct their preferences as a way of choosing between the two mean-
ings: though individuals acted collectively in framing and ratifying Arti-
cle III and the eleventh amendment, they held dramatically different
positions about whether states could be sued and thus would have varied
in their reactions to any given proposal. 31 Moreover, since they could
not have foreseen the way federal law would affect the states after the
post-Civil War constitutional amendments and the expansive interpreta-
tions of congressional power in the twentieth century, any attempt to
present their thinking about federal question jurisdiction is an anachro-
nistic fantasy.32
B. Nonhistorical Interpretation
Although the members of the present Court center their discussion
on historical evidence, they also reveal some of the nonhistorical analysis
that undoubtedly shapes their historical interpretations. For example,
Justice Brennan has written that he generally does not object to "the
interpretation of the Constitution in light of changed circumstances, and
unforeseen events-and with full regard for the purposes underlying the
text."13 3 He has also admitted that he resorts to argument about the in-
tent of the framers because he is convinced that the Court's eleventh
amendment doctrine represents "an untenable vision of the needs of the
29. I have occasionally felt the urge to write a film script about a superhero called
Framerman. Framerman appears upon the legal scene whenever judges have difficulty inter-
preting the Constitution. His superpower is the possession in a single mind of the collective
consciousness of all the framers'and ratifiers. He stands ready to answer any question, how-
ever unforeseen at the time of ratification, precisely as the entire body of relevant deci-
sionmakers at the time would have resolved it. No more guesswork! No more result-oriented
historical mumbo-jumbo! Dramatic conflict heightens as Framerman gives answers that sur-
prise and then outrage the judges. The judges could rise up in anger and murder our poor
superhero in the end, but this seems out of judicial character. Instead, what happens is this:
the judges begin to write opinions rejecting the controlling effect of original intent. Hearing
this, Framerman-bearing a slight resemblance to Tinkerbell, who would die if people stopped
believing in fairies-clutches at his heart and succumbs.
30. Powell, supra note 27, at 689.
31. The Court in Hans undertakes precisely this form of analysis in deciding to extend
the amendment beyond its literal meaning. See text accompanying note 60.
32. See Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent (Book Review), 54 CHI.
L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1987) (reviewing BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN).
Professor Powell takes issue with Professor Berger's originalist position and argues that Ber-
ger's assessment of original intent flows not from historical analysis but from Berger's own
personal political preference.
33. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
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federal system it purports to protect, ' 34 and "intrudes on the ideal of
liberty under law by protecting the States from the consequences of their
illegal conduct." 35 This makes the historical argument seem almost irrel-
evant: the real issue is what "vision of the needs of the federal system"
should prevail. If the Hans interpretation squared with his "vision,"
would Justice Brennan argue that the historical record shows that the
framers intended sovereign immunity to inhere in Article III?
Justice Powell, who has written the majority opinion in the Court's
recent key eleventh amendment cases, 36 has countered with his own in-
vocation of the present day value of the Hans interpretation, stating that
"the doctrine of sovereign immunity plays a vital role in our federal sys-
tem" 37 and that the "contours" of the doctrine follow the "structure and
requirements of the federal system." 38 The point of preserving the vital-
ity of the states, according to Justice Powell, is to maintain a "counter-
poise" to the power of the federal government. 39 Justice Powell and the
justices who agree with him assume there must be some significant sepa-
rate sphere for the states that the amendment protects and assert that the
doctrine that has developed reflects the proper vision of federalism. But
what exactly is this vision? Certainly, it consists of something less than
maximum enforcement of federal law in federal court and involves a bal-
ance between enforcing federal law and preserving inviolate a state en-
clave. The majority, however, does not offer any positive reason for
preserving such an enclave at the expense of federal law. Thus, it has
little success in convincing anyone who does not share the assumption
that one must exist for its own sake.
In the 1970s, before the Court began to focus so intensely on histori-
cal evidence, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote several of the
Court's key eleventh amendment opinions. In Edelman v. Jordan, 4 he
seemed to assume that the states ought to be given some significant sepa-
rate sphere when he wrote that the "use of state funds to make reparation
for the past ... would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh Amend-
ment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having
34. Id. at 248.
35. Id. at 302.
36. Welch v. Texas Dep't. of Pub. Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234; Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984).
37. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1983)).
38. Id. at 2953.
39. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239 n.2.
40. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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any present force. "41 Thus, his argument against accepting Justice Bren-
nan's limitation of state immunity to citizen-state diversity suits would be
that those cases lack "present force." But citizen-state diversity suits
held obvious importance to the framers and ratifiers of the eleventh
amendment who were reacting to Chisholm, so Justice Brennan's limited
interpretation does not work the kind of deprivation of meaning that
would undermine its plausibility. It may be that a constitutional provi-
sion historically important in protecting states from their overburden-
some war debts has dwindled into insignificance. 42
Moreover, to say that the amendment must have "present force" is
to abandon the originalist position.43 If we are to shift from historical
analysis and look at present needs, should we not take into account the
competing needs of individuals who allege state violations of federal law,
which Justice Brennan includes in his vision of federalism? These needs
may well overshadow the state's competing interest in retaining some
significant immunity. The mere existence of the eleventh amendment
does not demand that the Court strain to find some presently forceful
new use for it. Indeed, refocusing the question on present needs should
call into question whether the states deserve immunity at all.
A convincing argument for the Hans position, addressed to those
who voice -concern about preserving federal rights, would have to present
a vision of the states as alternative institutions capable of enforcing fed-
eral law and using state law to protect the same interests that federal law
addresses. 44 Obviously, states are not serving federal interests when they
are allegedly violating federal law. Hence, the short-term federal interest
41. Id. at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973)) (emphasis added). See also id. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("If sovereign immunity is to be at all meaningful, the Court must be reluctant to hold a State
to have waived its immunity simply by acting in its sovereign capacity.").
42. A few constitutional provisions are permitted to be insignificant. The protection the
Court once extended to the states under the tenth amendment has been withdrawn, replaced
by whatever protection Congress may decide to give, as a matter of political judgment, not
constitutional right. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). As
this Article argues, Congress has power to modify the substantive law that may be used to
achieve the equivalent of constitutional sovereign immunity. See infra text accompanying note
265. Thus, it is not necessary that the Court decide whether there is a present need to retain
some immunity for the state and strain the meaning of the eleventh amendment to create such
a protection.
43. Justice Rehnquist professes the originalist position. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
44. See generally Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases:
Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051. 1083-86 (1988)
(Younger abstention justified only by the capacity of state courts to enforce federal law); Alt-
house, supra note 18, at 1537-38 (deference to states justified when state law offers alternatives
that satisfy-or exceed-the goals established in federal law).
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in a particular case would justify intruding on the states. But arguably,
long-term federal interests might support refraining from imposing some
types of lawsuits on the states. If a certain degree of state power and
independence serves a function recognized as valuable and affirmative, 45
then refraining from enervating or destroying the states may serve long-
term federal interests. Nonetheless, the "counterpoise" afforded by state
independence must consist of an identifiable, affirmative function, other-
wise it is not reasonable to balance it against the interest in enforcing
federal law. Therefore, when analyzing the present purposes served by
sovereign immunity, we should go beyond the mere assumption that
some area of immunity must be given to the states for no particular rea-
son and ask what desirable function is enhanced by allowing the states
immunity. It is possible that a balance between intervention and immu-
nity is a positive good, but the Court's present analysis makes no direct
attempt to demonstrate this good or to tailor its doctrine to "follow the
contours" of any such positive function.46
Before analyzing Hans in these federal interest terms, however, it is
useful to explore the doctrine that mitigates the more harmful effects
Hans might otherwise have on the enforcement of federal law. The next
section of the Article explains much of this doctrine and, in doing so,
45. For an analysis of the historical background for viewing state sovereignty in terms of
the positive function of the states, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425 (1987).
46. The Court's present eleventh amendment analysis contrasts with the more functional
analysis it has used to determine the scope of the official immunities that shield individual state
officials from personal liability when they are sued for violating federal rights under color of
state law. In deciding the scope of immunity for these officials, the Court carefully considers
the effect of the immunity given. It identifies the positive values served by immunity and
tailors immunity to "follow the contours" of those values. The Court has given absolute im-
munity to some officials, chiefly judges, legislators, and prosecutors in the judicial phase of
their functioning; others enjoy only qualified-or "good faith"-immunity. Absolute immu-
nity is restricted to those officials who, at least in the Court's judgment, need the greatest
freedom from inhibition. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). Even these offi-
cials emerge from the cloak of immunity when they act beyond the scope of their official
duties. Id. at 243. Most officials receive only good faith, qualified immunity from liability for
damages. Unless these officials sincerely believed that they were acting in accordance with
federal law and their belief was reasonable, they cannot avail themselves of the immunity
defense. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975). Visiting personal liability upon
officials who had no reason to think they were acting unlawfully arguably would discourage
individuals from entering public employment or would lead them to perform their duties tim-
idly and thus to disserve the public in general. On the other hand, the threat of personal
damages deters activity that the official is capable of perceiving as unlawful at the time the
action is taken. Although the complex official immunity doctrine the Court has created does
not perfectly track functional goals, the case law that develops these doctrines deserves some
praise for the way it has used the concepts of deterrence and encouragement to shape doctrine.
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brings out the signs of federal interest analysis found in the cases. It will
then take up the Hans debate once again.
II. Searching for a "Vision of the Needs of the Federal
System" in Current Eleventh Amendment Doctrine
The legal fiction created in Ex Parte Young and the tailoring the
Supreme Court has engaged in over the years, complicated and contra-
dictory though it is, can nevertheless illuminate the federal interests un-
derlying the Court's decisionmaking. To a large extent, the Supreme
Court in fact has followed and begun to articulate the kind of federal
interest analysis outlined in this Article. The majority of the Supreme
Court has asserted that the "contours" of its eleventh amendment doc-
trine follow the "structure and requirements of the federal system." 47
This section of the Article does not assume the perfection of existing
doctrine, but it does consider how that doctrine reveals ideas about fed-
eral interests and gives these ideas definition. New understanding of
these ideas will make it possible both to assess existing doctrine and to
propose ways in which doctrine might develop. 48
47. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2953
(1987). For a discussion of the possible decline of support for moderate though complicated
eleventh amendment doctrine, see infra note 157.
48. For a similar analysis of eleventh amendment case law, see Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4668 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, reviewing
the entire range of case law, concludes that the Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence
represents a judicial balancing of federal and state interests. Looking at the same cases and
citing much of the same evidence that Justice Stevens relies on, this Article concludes that the
Court dispenses with state immunity when it perceives strong enough federal interests. Justice
Stevens further argues that the Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence cannot rest on a
constitutional foundation, as the majority contends it does, because the balancing of federal
and state interests "is antithetical to traditional understandings of Article III subject-matter
jurisdiction." Id. at 4669. Thus, according to Justice Stevens, with the exception of the one
"correct and literal" interpretation of the eleventh amendment (barring citizen-state diversity
suits that do not raise federal questions), all of the Court's eleventh amendment doctrines,
including Hans itself, are judge-made, "prudential" doctrines. Id. at 4668-69. These doctrines,
motivated by federalism concerns, resulting from judicial interest balancing, resemble the
Court's abstention doctrines. Id. at 4668-69 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and
cases that follow it). Hans' status as a mere judicial creation, according to Justice Stevens,
explains the Court's ability to impose federal court jurisdiction when federal interests demand
it. See 57 U.S.L.W. at 4469 & n.3. It also explains why Congress has the power to abrogate
the state's immunity: "Congress is not superseding a constitutional provision in these cases,
but rather is setting aside the Court's assessment of the extent to which the use of constitution-
ally prescribed federal authority is prudent." Id. at 4669. While Justice Stevens' analysis coin-
cides to a large extent with the perceptions of the case law explained in this Article, I do not
find the balancing of interests "antithetical" to Article III interpretation; balancing commonly
underlies constitutional interpretation, whether or not the written opinions reveal it. Cer-
tainly, Justice Stevens' ideas deserve more extensive study than is possible here. One could
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A. The Troublesome Coexistence of Hans and Young
Although Hans v. Louisiana brings federal question cases within the
states' eleventh amendment immunity, other doctrinal permutations re-
strict its force. Not all federal question cases aimed at controlling state
violations of federal law meet eleventh amendment exclusion from fed-
eral court. Just as a majority of the Supreme Court has seen Hans as
necessary to prevent the amendment from dwindling into insignificance,
it also has seen the need for the legal fiction of Ex Parte Young 49 to
ensure that states do not violate important federal rights with impunity.50
In the often quoted words of Professor Wright, "The doctrine of Ex
Parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional
government and the rule of law." 5' Under Young, plaintiffs can receive
federal court relief-at least prospective relief-from violations of their
federal rights by naming as defendants the individual state officials who
acted for the state.52 Since the state can never act without a human
agent, this device would work a complete circumvention of Hans were it
not for additional doctrinal embellishments designed to hem in Young.
Young began as an attempt to enjoin Minnesota's attorney general
from enforcing a state statute, on the ground that it violated the federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court permitted the federal court to hear
this suit by theorizing that the individual state official's violation of con-
stitutional law stripped him of his status as a representative of the state. 53
Thus, to sue the official was not to sue the state. The majority reached
attempt to reinterpret a great deal of constitutional law this way: to separate the "correct and
literal" from the mere products of balancing and then to reclassify the latter category as judge-
made prudential law, subject to further judicial or congressional lawmaking. Whether this
kind of reinterpretation is advisable or even possible must remain a matter for future study.
49. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
50. Even before Young, the device of suing state officials to avoid sovereign immunity
existed. Chief Justice Marshall recognized the availability of this device in Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 741 (1824). Professor Collins provides an excellent
discussion of the way in which courts limited the device to suits involving state officials who
were liable in common-law tort, but who were unable to raise the defense of state authorization
because the state law in question was unconstitutional. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the
Eleventh Amendment (Book Review), 88 COLUM. L. REv. 212, 222-27 (1988) (reviewing J.
ORTH, supra note 6). The innovation of Young was to permit suit based directly on the viola-
tion of federal law. Id. at 240-41. For a contrary view of the history of eleventh amendment
interpretation, viewing the post-Reconstruction period typified by Hans as aberrant, and
Young as consistent with an earlier line of cases beginning with Osborn, see J. ORTH, supra
note 6, at 121-35.
51. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Wright makes
this statement after writing that Young "rests on the purest fiction .... is illogical [and] only
doubtfully in accord with the prior decisions." Id.
52. Young, 209 U.S. at 167; see infra text accompanying notes 72-88, 135-47.
53. Id.
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this holding even though the injunction sought could. supply relief only
because the state charged its attorney general with the responsibility of
enforcing its laws and even though the attorney general's capacity to vio-
late the Constitution depended on viewing his action as state action. 54
Untenable as the theory of Young may appear, and as deeply divided as
the Supreme Court has been in recent years, Young stirs no controversy
today.55 Young does not itself purport to create a legal fiction. The writ-
ten opinion speaks with judicious rationality. It is only in later cases that
use Young despite criticisms of its logical integrity that the Court has
simply called the Young analysis a fiction and persisted in relying on it,
without insisting on the logical structure of the case.56 Openly calling
Young a legal fiction hardly signals its imminent demise; indeed, we may
think of a legal fiction as a logically untenable concept that the Court
fully intends to cling to.57
Hans is not terribly different from Young in its style and subsequent
history. Indeed, Hans could be stigmatized as every bit as much of a
legal fiction as Young. Hans claims constitutional status for an idea that
has no tie to any constitutional language. Article III says nothing about
state immunity. In particular, the state-citizen diversity clause58 sug-
gests-as the Chisholm Court held-just the opposite.59 The eleventh
amendment refers only to suits brought by noncitizens of a state. In find-
ing constitutional immunity for suits brought by citizens suing their own
states, Hans constructs a nonexistent scenario-proposing the idea of
54. Id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
56. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
Professor Orth writes that "stigmatiz[ing]" Young as a fiction ignores the reality that the offi-
cial is in fact made the defendant in the case, that the official is actually the actor about to
injure the plaintiff (in a suit for prospective relief), and that it is true that the state cannot
authorize him to act unconstitutionally. J. ORTH, supra note 6, at 138. Orth decries the
"heavy conceptual handicap" imposed on Young by openly tagging it a fiction, with the result
that it "often fall[s] victim to concepts whose fictitiousness is better masked." Id. For an
expansion of Orth's implicit suggestion that Hans is a legal fiction, see infra text accompanying
notes 58-60.
57. For an extended and wide-ranging study of legal fictions, see Fuller, Legal Fictions,
25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 513, 877 (1930). Professor Fuller observes that courts create legal fictions
to express needed legal developments that they are unable to weave into the law's seamless
web. Later, as the law develops, courts become able to revise their fictions and express them in
standard, rational, logical form. Id at 519-29. Young, however, does not follow this pattern.
Originally, the Court expressed the Young doctrine "nonfictionally." Then when its logical
deficiencies became apparent the Court began to call it a fiction. Use of a legal fiction did not
turn out to be part of a process of developing a coherent legal framework, but a concession that
the law's needed elements did not fit logically and a decision to tolerate that lack of fit.
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
59. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-53 (1793).
federal question jurisdiction in a suit brought by a citizen against his own
state and imagining the framers of the eleventh amendment rejecting that
jurisdiction as well---and then treats the amendment as if that scenario
had taken place.
Hans established the terms of eleventh amendment discussion.
Hans' theory may be just as fictitious as Young's, but since it came first,
Hans established its rule free from the constraint of keeping its rationale
consistent with Young. 6 1 The Young Court, however, could not lay
down its rule without creating conflicts that would invite the "legal fic-
tion" label.62 There is a tyranny to chronology here. The first interpreta-
tion may be no more accurate than the second. In fact, there is reason to
think that the later, conflicting story lies closer to the truth: the effort
the Court made to set out such a strained doctrine suggests a strong con-
viction of its correctness. 63 The contorted and self-contradictory nature
60. Justice Bradley wrote,
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to
it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by
its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States:
can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that
it would is almost an absurdity on its face.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
This statement itself validates a method of constitutional interpretation that is "an absurdity
on its face." Using this approach, one could propose any formulation of words and read it into
the Constitution if one could argue successfully that there was ever a point in history when the
states would have ratified it as an amendment to the Constitution. Hans makes more sense if
one assumes instead that sovereign immunity was implicit in Article III and that Congress
proposed the eleventh amendment to correct the Supreme Court's failure to perceive the impli-
cation in Chisholm. It is one thing to read the original Constitution to contain a multitude of
unstated assumptions, particularly when there was actual debate during the ratification pro-
cess. See supra note 12. It is quite another to allow subsequently arising assumptions to mod-
ify that document without following the prescribed amendment process.
61. Hans simply ignores any earlier cases that conflict with its holding and creates a new
legal context. By framing its rule in straightforward terms that would not appear at all ficti-
tious, the Young Court could have overruled Hans or limited it to contract clause cases and
consigned the case to the doctrinal dust heap. See supra note 19.
62. Some authors would characterize all legal formulations as fictions. Soifer, Reviewing
Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 876 (1986) ("In our post-realist world.., our sense is that
legal fictions are not some small, awkward patch but rather the whole seamless cloth of the
law."); see also Riker, Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It
Matter 2 COMP. POL. 138, 146 (1969) ("Federalism is no more than a constitutional legal
fiction which can be given whatever content seems appropriate at the moment."). The distinc-
tion of Young is that it is openly called a legal fiction by justices who otherwise craft rational
and realistic-looking rules.
63. See generally Fuller, supra note 57, at 519-29 (discussing judicial motives for engag-
ing in legal fictions). According to Professor Fuller, "legal categories are constantly being
remade to fit new conditions," and a legal fiction is just "a cruder outcropping of a process of
intellectual adaptation which goes on constantly without attracting attention." Id. at 525.
That is to say, the use of the term "fiction" occurs when a change "has taken place in an
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of the Young opinion may have resulted from the Court's attempt to state
its rule in the "language of Hans." If Hans were overruled, the Court
could reach the same result in a simple and straightforward manner.
Despite the strength of its commitment to Young, the Court also has
developed doctrines restricting its effect, just as Young was needed to
restrict the effect of Hans. This attempt to reach a middle ground be-
tween the absolute immunity that would result from an unrestricted
Hans and the nearly full access to federal court" that would result from
an unrestricted Young has produced the present complexity of eleventh
amendment doctrine. The decision to recognize simultaneously the im-
portance of federal court access and the importance of state immunity
inevitably leads to confusion, contradiction, and incoherence. The Court
easily could dispel the fog by rejecting either concept. If Hans were over-
ruled according to the theory argued by the Supreme Court minority,65
plaintiffs could sue states in federal court under federal question jurisdic-
tion, rendering the Young fiction obsolete. If Young were overruled,
ungraceful and inelegant manner." Id Professor Fuller expected the law to continue to de-
velop so that the fiction would only be used temporarily, until the context which made it
appear out of place changes enough to cause it to fit in quite well. Id. at 529. The fiction thus
serves as a "scaffolding" that need only remain in place until courts erect the new legal struc-
ture. Id.
64. Even if the Court permitted the doctrine espoused in Young to expand to its full
potential, it would not defeat state immunity from state claims that find their way into federal
court solely through the citizen-state diversity-the jurisdiction specifically limited by the
eleventh amendment. It is not clear what would happen to state claims that were pendent to
federal claims. See infra note 258.
65. An alternative theory for rejecting Hans relies on the text of the eleventh amendment.
Under this theory, the amendment bars all suits by noncitizens of a state, including those based
on federal question. See Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1342, 1346 (1989). If Hans were overruled on this ground, Young would remain
useful for noncitizens asserting federal claims against the state. But see Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to Justice Scalia:
If [the text of the eleventh amendment] were intended as a comprehensive descrip-
tion of state sovereign immunity in federal courts . . . it would unquestionably be
most reasonable to interpret it as providing immunity only when the sole basis of
federal jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship that it describes. ... For there is no
plausible reason why one would wish to protect a State from being sued in federal
court for violation of federal law... when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or
country, but to permit a State to be sued there when the plaintiff is a citizen of the
state itself.
Id. at 4673"(emphasis in original). Justice Scalia goes on to reject this textual approach on the
ground that the eleventh amendment is "important not merely for what it said but for what it
reflected: a consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity... was part of the understood
background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provi-
sions did not mean to sweep away." Id. (relying on Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
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Hans would work a neat, flat bar to all suits against states, unless the
state had consented or Congress had abrogated the states' immunity. 66
The voices favoring rejection of immunity by overruling Hans are
persistent, 67 but no one urges overruling Young as a solution to the inco-
herence of eleventh amendment doctrine. In Edelman v. Jordan, Justice
Douglas, dissenting from the Court's limitation on federal court access,
wrote that if the majority really thought that litigants could not receive
retrospective relief, it ought to overrule Young. 68 But this was an empty
dare, which evoked no response. As Justice Douglas put it, "there is
none eager to take the step."'69 Even the majority that adheres to Hans
shows no inclination at all to overrule Young. That Hans and Young
make such an unattractive and troublesome pair70 indicates that, for the
majority of the Court, both decisions uphold important constitutional
values that cannot be sacrificed. The cost of this awkward coexistence is
severe doctrinal disarray, 7 1 which this Article now takes up in detail.
B. The Retrospective-Prospective Distinction
The most prominent doctrine limiting the potential reach of Young
is the retrospective-prospective distinction. Young's device of naming
only the state official fails when the relief sought is retrospective. 72 The
retrospective-prospective distinction forces plaintiffs to limit their federal
court suits to requests for injunctions and declaratory relief. For exam-
ple, they may ask a federal court to prevent a state attorney general from
enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute or to require state
officials to improve allegedly unconstitutional conditions in a state prison
or mental hospital, but they must go to state court if they want damages
or other retrospective relief.73
66. For a discussion of congressional power to abrogate states' immunity, see infra text
accompanying notes 151-219.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 7-22.
68. 415 U.S. 651, 685 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1974). The denial of retrospective relief
in Edelman, is discussed in part B of this section.
69. Id.
70. According to Justice Brennan, Hans is "inconsistent with the essential function of the
federal courts-to provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and en-
forcement of the supreme law of the land-[and] it has led to the development of a complex
body of technical rules made necessary by the need to circumvent the intolerable constriction
of federal jurisdiction that would otherwise occur." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 255-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1984).
71. For a caveat on the present Court's tolerance of doctrinal disarray, see infra note 157.
72. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-72.
73. Plaintiffs also may choose to bring all of their claims for relief to state court, but in so
doing, they may encounter common-law doctrines of sovereign immunity. In Edelman, the
plaintiffs ultimately did receive their retrospective relief in state court. See Lichtenstein, Retro-
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Although initially the Court attempted to explain this distinction in
terms of who would really pay for the relief requested, the distinction
quickly became embedded in the case law, subject to little discussion at
all. An examination of the cases, however, shows that the persistent ad-
herence to this distinction reflects the majority's judgment that the im-
portance of ensuring compliance with federal law in the future simply
outweighs compensation for past injuries. That is, an analysis of federal
interests underlies the Court's decisionmaking.
1. Why Draw the Line Between Past and Present?
In defense of the retrospective relief exception to the Young fiction,
the Court accurately reasons that no one expects defendant state officials
to pay damages with their own money.74 But no matter how expensive a
prospective injunction becomes the Court does not relinquish its adher-
ence to the fiction, even though no one expects an individual state em-
ployee to pay for the busing of school children, or the construction of
new prison cells, or other similar expenses that may easily far exceed the
forbidden damage awards. 75
active Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight
Zone, 32 CASE W. RES. 364, 375 (1982).
74. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 ("These funds will obviously not be paid out of
the pocket of petitioner Edelman."); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1972)
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973), quoted in Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 ("It is not pretended that
these payments are to come from the personal resources of these appellants.").
State officials may, however, be sued in their personal capacity for individual damages, to
the extent permitted by doctrines of official immunity. See supra note 46. These lawsuits are
limited to the tortious acts committed by the defendant-officials and can only be satisfied out
of their personal assets, though state funds may be expended if the state indemnifies its offi-
cials. The Court overtly sloughs off this intrusion on the states' treasuries, calling it voluntary,
but states may have to provide indemnity in ordei to attract employees. See, e.g., Benson v.
Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1986). See infra note 156. State officials cannot be sued per-
sonally for contractual and other state obligations. See Collins, supra note 50, at 224-25. In
such instances, they can only be sued in their official capacity, in which case the rule of
Edelman applies and imposes state sovereign immunity. Curiously, the immunity extended to
a state excludes all retrospective relief whereas the immunity granted to individual officials
terminates if they knew or should have known that their actions would violate federal law. To
further complicate immunity doctrine, local governments are denied not only eleventh amend-
ment immunity, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), but
also any qualified immunity similar to the kind offered to individual officials who act in good
faith. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
75. Courts ordering prospective relief in the face of the obvious inability of the named
defendant to pay for the ordered changes have found ways to gloss over the shortcomings of
the litigation's party structure. In one case, a defendant governor argued that he could not
spend money to correct conditions in a state institution for the mentally retarded without an
act by the legislature that he was unable to obtain. The district court found the governor in
contempt for failing to spend money even though to do so would have violated state law. The
appellate court noted that the district court should instead "order the state either to take the
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An interesting aspect of this paradox is the way courts began ac-
cepting expensive injunctions with no real analysis, perhaps fearing that
close scrutiny would undermine Young itself. The Supreme Court made
the initial distinction in Edelman v. Jordan, in which it accepted a pro-
spective order that welfare payments be made in accordance with federal
standards. 76 Then in Milliken v. Bradley,77 it faced the more difficult
problem of ordering a state to provide remedial education as part of a
school desegregation plan. The Court spoke entirely in terms of the pros-
pectiveness of the injunction and distinguished it from a one-time "raid
on the state treasury for an accrued monetary liability."'78 This analysis
rendered the issue quite simple, removing it from the realistic concerns
about who really pays, which were confronted in Edelman. Lower
courts thereafter could avoid a realistic discussion of who pays for the
relief with a simple citation to Milliken.79
Since, clearly, the retrospective-prospective distinction does not flow
from any realistic assessment of who pays for the relief or who deserves
the label "real party in interest,"'80 justification for the distinction must
lie elsewhere. A clue may be found in the Court's references to the ex-
penses of complying with a prospective order as having only an "ancil-
lary effect on the state treasury. ' 81 The term "ancillary" suggests that
the Court sees compliance with federal law as the primary goal and the
spending of money as secondary, in the Court's words, merely an "inevi-
steps necessary to rectify the violations or to close the institution." New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). But in a concurring opinion,
Judge Kearse, though sensitive to federal court's "reluctan[ce] to cause 'needless direct con-
frontations' with state legislatures," id. at 166 n.1 (quoting Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122,
1132 (8th Cir. 1977)), asserted, 'There is little doubt that a federal court can issue a remedial
order which as a practical matter requires expenditures by the state." Id. (citing Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977)). For an extended discussion of judicial powers in this area,
see Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural
Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1984).
76. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
77. 433 U.S. 267, 269 (1977).
78. Id. at 289-90 & n.22.
79. See, e.g, Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Chu Drua Cha v.
Noot, 696 F.2d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 1982) ("For some reason, the courts regard an order for the
future payment of money, no matter what the amount, as somehow less destructive of state
sovereign immunity than an order for the payment of sums past due.").
80. The Court, however, speaks of the state as the "real party in interest," even though
that concept does not clarify the retrospective-prospective distinction. The Court frequently
quotes language from Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945):
"[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the
real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit
even though individual officials are nominal defendants." See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
81. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
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table consequence of the principle announced in Ex Parte Young."8 2 The
secondariness of the expense, rather than the amount, distinguishes fu-
ture from past relief. In contrast, one can characterize past relief as only
the spending of money, secondary to nothing.83 According to this view,
the action in violation of federal law already has taken place and cannot
be undone. If a state must use its present budget to compensate for past
violations of federal law in administering its public aid system, it "will
invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the con-
tinuing obligations" of that system.8 4
Seen this way, the Court's retrospective-prospective distinction re-
flects a comparative valuation of federal interests in the two different
forms of relief. Retrospective relief will only compensate for harm suf-
fered in the past and thus does not directly promote the interests embod-
ied in the public aid system. In the rather callous and simplistic logic of
Edelman, compensation may appease those whose needs went unsatisfied
in the past, but only prospective relief actually meets the daily needs of
the poor.8 5 The Court, sensitive to the finite nature of the state's budget,
82. Id.
83. Another reason for the retrospective-prospective distinction is the different impact
that retrospective relief has on the state budget. Accumulated liability for past wrongs affects
the state all at once and after it has expended its budget for the relevant time period. A state
can, however, attempt to accommodate prospective relief within each year's current budgeting
process. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Moreover, states may find ways to adjust future conduct to minimize the
expense of prospective relief orders; this flexibility is, of course, foreclosed with respect to
retrospective relief. Id. Expensive injunctions are frequently justified by the lower federal
courts on this ground. See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206,. 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1977)
(noting that a state has the alternative of closing the institution, thus avoiding any expendi-
tures); see also Hirschhorn, supra note 75, at 1860 (distinguishing retrospective relief, which
runs to "identifiable individuals," from prospective relief because it runs to a class of "unspeci-
fied future clients of the institution" who will receive relief as a "side effect of a properly
functioning institution"); Jackson, supra note 18, at 95-96 (prospective relief, while expensive,
allows state legislative flexibility, and may also be easier to enforce than retrospective relief
requiring legislative action).
84. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666 n. 11. Without affording any explanation, the majority
assumes that the state would be forced to use its "definable allocation" in the payment of
public aid benefits to compensate victims of past violations and therefore that retroactive relief
would necessarily diminish the total pool of state funds available for public aid. Id. The Court
may have recognized this limitation because it envisioned public officials who are sued as inef-
fectual in forcing a state to allocate more money to public aid, or to increase its total revenues
to fund past relief, but as capable of spending the money already allocated to their department
in accordance with the court's order.
85. Id. Justice Rehnquist again quotes Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973) (emphasis in original):
[Tihe fundamental goal of congressional welfare legislation [is] the satisfaction of the
ascertained needs of impoverished persons. Federal standards are designed to ensure
that those needs are equitably met; and there may perhaps be cases in which prompt
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responds by drawing a line in what appears to be the most sensible place:
between prospective and retrospective relief. It is not that the cost of
prospective relief is inconsequential compared with retrospective relief,
but that it more sharply and directly connects to the federal interest em-
bodied in the particular federal law upon which the case is based.
Thus, the retrospective-prospective distinction represents a drawing
of a jurisdictional boundary in response to the strength of the federal
interest at stake.8 6 One must, of course, recognize that there is a differ-
ence between following this principle of jurisdictional line- drawing in ac-
cordance with the federal interest and choosing to draw that line in the
best place. In making the retrospective-prospective distinction, one can
safely say, the majority has appropriately ranked the forms of relief in
order of importance. Nevertheless, it may be that both forms of relief
ought to fall within the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, since the en-
forcement of federal law with either form of relief serves the federal inter-
est. Even emphasizing, as the majority does, the prominence of the
federal interest in ongoing compliance with federal law, one cannot read-
ily exclude retroactive relief. Past relief serves not only to compensate
but to deter.87 For example, in the instance of a state-administered fed-
eral benefits program, Justice Marshall argued that the state has "every-
thing to gain and nothing to lose" by following an erroneous but money-
saving standard until it is sued for prospective relief. 88 If the Court does
indeed construct its eleventh amendment doctrine in response to its ideas
about the federal interests at stake, as this Article contends, then there is
a great deal of room for litigants to elaborate and emphasize the dimen-
sion of interest involved in particular kinds of remedies and particular
kinds of cases. Arguments of this kind, in addition to formalistic argu-
ments about what is truly prospective and what is not, may help to avoid
the kind of result encountered in Edelman, in which the majority saw
little significance in retrospective relief.
payment of funds wrongfully withheld will serve that end. As time goes by, however,
retroactive payments become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence
between previously ascertained and existing needs becomes less clear.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
87. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 691-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. It may be that a state is following a reasonable standard, but is challenged by
plaintiffs, and that the state may, if subjected to jurisdiction, ultimately prevail in the lawsuit.
The threat of lawsuits, however, may "overdeter" states, causing them to restrict their activi-
ties or to hedge their policy choices in ways not mandated by federal law. Yet the Edelman
doctrine is not the only way to control this sort of overdeterrence. The Court could fashion
limited substantive, rather than jurisdictional immunity, similar to the qualified immunity that
shields individual officers from liability. See supra notes 46, 74.
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2. The Federal Interest in "Notice Relief"
Edelman handed federal courts the task of determining which kinds
of expenses are merely "ancillary" to prospective relief and thus permis-
sible and which too closely resemble compensation for past wrongs and
are thus barred. In Justice Rehnquist's memorable concession, "the dif-
ference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and that permitted under Ex Parte Young will not in many instances be
that between day and night."' 89 This section considers the issue of notice
relief, one area in which the Supreme Court has drawn that difficult line.
Examining the Court's reasoning helps identify the notions of federal in-
terest that determine jurisdictional doctrine.
The form of relief that has proven most difficult to classify falls
under the rubric "notice relief." Notice relief consists of ordering that
letters be sent to the alleged victims of some past violation of law by the
state to inform them that they may go to state court for the very recovery
that Edelman makes unavailable in federal court. In Quern v. Jordan, 90 a
later stage of the Edelman litigation, the Supreme Court validated fed-
eral court power to issue this form of relief. Edelman had denied the
federal court power to order the payment of welfare benefits already lost
because of the state's illegal delays, although it affirmed the power to
enjoin state officials to avoid future delays.9 1 In Quern, in an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court viewed notice relief as falling on
the Young side of the notably obscure line between permissible and im-
permissible relief.92 Sending notice to would-be claimants did not exactly
equate with the actual payment of retroactive benefits: there were several
intervening steps over which the state had control 93 The Court was
therefore willing to view the notice sent as an aspect of the prospective
relief ordered. 94 The expense of notice relief could qualify for the magi-
cal adjective "ancillary," and thus merit Young treatment.
89. Edelman, 415 U.S at 667.
90. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
91. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 658-59. For further discussion of Edelman, see supra text ac-
companying notes 76-88. The plaintiffs had attempted to bring their request for past relief
within the ambit of Young by characterizing it as equitable restitution and arguing that the
distinction to be made was between legal and equitable relief. The Court instead articulated
the retrospective-prospective distinction described above.
92. 440 U.S. at 347-48.
93. Id. The Court noted that the "chain of causation" between the notice and the pay-
ment of retroactive benefits was "by no means unbroken" and "contain[ed] numerous missing
links." Id. at 347. The notified persons would have to decide whether to seek relief, and to
initiate the available state administrative procedures, and then the state would make the ulti-
mate determination of eligibility for past benefits. Id. at 347-48.
94. Id. at 347-49. The expense of sending the notice was minimal and even the state did
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The recent case of Green v. Mansour95 presented a key difference
that led the Court to reject notice relief, and in doing so, to shed some
indirect light on its vision of federalism. In Green, the federal court
could not grant an injunction affecting future conduct, and consequently
notice relief was the sole remedy available in the case. The Green litiga-
tion began as an attack on Michigan's method of calculating benefits
under the federal Aid to Families with Dependant Children program. 96
While the litigation was pending, however, Congress made two changes
in the program that mooted the claims for prospective relief. First, Con-
gress expressly required that the states deduct childcare costs from the
calculation of earned income, and Michigan began complying with the
new provision. 97 Though it was now clear that the state's past practice, if
continued, would violate federal law, it remained unsettled whether the
past denial of this deduction had violated federal law. Second, Congress
required automatic inclusion of a step-parent's income, which was the
practice Michigan had followed all along.98 Still, it was possible that
automatic inclusion of this income was illegal before Congress amended
the program. With the requests for prospective relief mooted, the district
court dismissed the remainder of the litigation on eleventh amendment
grounds.99 The plaintiffs appealed, citing Quern for the proposition that
the federal court still had jurisdiction to consider whether they were enti-
tled to notice relief.'00
The plaintiffs argued that notice relief is an "independent form of
prospective relief," and thus that it did not matter that other prospective
relief was unavailable. 10 1 In analyzing this question, Justice Rehnquist
stressed the federal interest underlying the use of Young to allow suits for
prospective relief in federal court: "Remedies designed to end a continu-
ing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest
not make any objection to this "incidental administrative expense." Id. at 347. Its real objec-
tion was to the fact that the notice concerned unpaid past benefits. See also Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 692 (1978). In that case, the Court awarded plaintiff's attorney's fees accrued in
their effort to force state compliance with the federal court's injunction to remedy prison con-
ditions. The Hutto Court emphasized that federal courts needed a way to enforce the injunc-
tions that Young permits them to issue. Id. at 690.
95. 474 U.S. 64 (1985).




100. Id. at 67. Since a determination of whether the state's practices were illegal was
unnecessary to the adjudication of claims for prospective relief, the plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment to obtain a ruling that the past practices were illegal. Id.
101. Id. at 69.
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in assuring the supremacy of [federal] law."'10 2 The Court also spoke in
terms of whether the relief was "ancillary," but it seems more accurate
to say that the absence of a strong federal interest-defined by the Court
as an interest in compelling ongoing compliance with federal law-influ-
enced where the Court drew the line limiting federal court jurisdiction.10 3
In his discussion of whether the notice relief was permissible Justice
Rehnquist made a key shift in usage of the term "ancillary." He wrote
that notice relief was barred because there was no other form of relief
that was prospective and to which the notice relief could be made "ancil-
lary." But prior to Green the Court had used the word "ancillary" to
describe the expense the state would encounter in carrying out a prospec-
tive injunction.' °4 To be consistent with prior usage, the Court should
have decided whether notice relief was prospective or retrospective, and
if prospective, it then could have brushed aside the argument that the
state, not the named defendant, would bear the cost of complying with
the prospective relief by tagging that expense "ancillary."10 5 Had it un-
dertaken this analysis, the Court might have characterized the giving of
notice as prospective since it is an act that defendants are compelled to
perform in the future, 0 6 although it is causally tied to the eventual pay-
ment of benefits, through a state court action of the sort that Edelman
held to be retrospective. The litigants had framed the issue this way,
using the language of Quern. That the Court nevertheless declined to
enter into this analysis indicated that it was not primarily concerned with
whether the relief requested was truly prospective.
This deviation from prior usage of the term "ancillary," whether
unwitting or not, is revealing. From it, we may perceive the essential
motivation that underlies the Court's decisions to extend or curtail fed-
102. Id. at 68. The Court cites Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 102 (1984). For a discussion of Pennhurst, see infra text accompanying notes 135-47.
103. See Green, 474 U.S. at 70. Justice Brennan was joined in dissent by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. This minority has consistently urged overruling Hans. See supra text
accompanying notes 7-22. Justice Brennan argued that because no significant costs are im-
posed in giving notice, there is no eleventh amendment bar. Green, 474 U.S. at 80 (Justice
Marshall in dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens). Unlike the majority, which be-
gan its analysis with a presumption of state separateness, requiring a sufficient federal interest
to justify encroachment, the dissenting justices began their separate opinions with a presump-
tion of federal jurisdiction looking instead for sufficient state interest to overcome the federal
presumption. Id. ("[lilt is ... hard to see what weight, if any, exists on the State's side of the
scale, and why that weight should overcome the interest in vindicating federal law.").
104. See, eg., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
105. At least one court has taken note of this shift in usage. See Appleyard v. Wallace,
754 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 1985).
106. At least one court has taken this approach in interpreting Quern. See Moore v.
Miller, 612 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
eral court jurisdiction in the face of federalism concerns. Notice relief
did not justify indulgence in the Young fiction, not so much because the
Court lacked a prospective injunction to append it to, but because only
the federal interest in the ongoing compliance with federal law would
have impressed the majority as strong enough to justify expanding the
boundary of federal court jurisdiction into an area entailing eleventh
amendment concerns. 107 Perhaps we should stigmatize the retrospective-
prospective distinction as a legal fiction as well, for it hides the Court's
real concern with the varying levels of federal interest in providing differ-
ent types of relief for violations of federal law. 0 8
Recognizing that an assessment of federal interest underlies doctri-
nal linedrawing will not enable us to predict decisions infallibly, for deci-
sionmakers will differ in their assessment of the federal interest at stake.
One could contend, as did Justice Marshall in Edelman, that the interest
in "assuring the supremacy of federal law" also supports the extension of
federal jurisdiction to compensate victims of past violations, particularly
given the future deterrence value of that compensation. 109 The majority,
however, viewed these interests as "insufficient to overcome the dictates
of the Eleventh Amendment."11 0 Despite the inevitable uncertainty that
arises from these different assessments, analyzing jurisdictional issues in
terms of federal interest at least reflects the thought processes that lead to
the Court's decisions more accurately than does the use of amorphous
categories like prospective, retrospective, and ancillary.
In a somewhat different jurisdictional context, Justice Brennan has
raised the following criticism of federal interest analysis: "[A] test based
upon an ad hoc evaluation of the importance of the federal interest is
infinitely malleable: at what point does a federal interest become strong
enough to create jurisdiction?"'' The only answer is that federal inter-
est analysis goes on whether the Court admits it or masks it. The formal
logic and legal fictions used to mask it also are malleable, and federal
interests determine the shape they ultimately take.
107. Green, 474 U.S. at 71.
108. For an alternate analysis of the foundation of the Court's distinctions, see Pagan,
Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REV. 447, 473 (1986) (the intrusiveness of the
remedy sought determines the distinctions made).
109. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 691-92. See supra text accompanying note 88.
110. Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
111. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 882 n.l (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In Merrell Dow, the majority determined the outer boundary of
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by looking at the federal interest in adju-
dicating a state law cause of action that contained an element of federal law. Id. at 806-07 n.1.
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3. Prospective Relieffor Past Violations of Federal Law
In Papasan v. Alain, 11 2 another recent Supreme Court case employ-
ing the retrospective-prospective distinction, the Court made surprisingly
revealing statements about its reasons for using the Young fiction.
Papasan concerned the history of school land grants in Mississippi. The
northern twenty-three counties of Mississippi, which had belonged to the
Chickasaw Indian Nation until their cession to the United States by
treaty in 1832, were sold by the United States without reserving sections
of the land for the support of schools, the practice it followed in the sale
of all the other portions of Mississippi. 1 3 To "remedy this oversight,"
Congress, in 1836, provided for the reservation of other land for schools,
giving this land to the state.'1 4 In 1856 Mississippi sold the land and
invested the proceeds in loans to railroads, an investment that lost all
value when the railroads were destroyed in the Civil War.11 5 This left a
great disparity between the schools in the Chickasaw Cession and the
schools in the rest of Mississippi, which received income from reserved
lands. 116 To compensate for this lack of income, the state legislature an-
nually allocated to the Chickasaw schools an amount equivalent to inter-
est on the lost loan to the railroad." 7 Despite this allocation, the schools
in the Chickasaw Cession found themselves at a severe disadvantage; the
annual allocation amounted to about 63 cents per pupil, compared to the
average $75.34 per pupil in townships provided with income from the
reserved lands. 818
Chickasaw Cession school officials and students sued various state
officials in federal court, asserting a federal common-law breach of trust
in the sale of the land and the subsequent investment in the railroad and
a violation of equal protection in the resulting deprivation of a minimally
adequate education.' 9 The plaintiffs sought either a trust fund or the
allocation of land sufficient to remedy the disparity in income. 120
112. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
113. Id. at 269-72.
114. Id. at 271-72.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 273.
117. Id.
118. Id. Three members of the Court (Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist, concurring in part
and dissenting in part) rejected the equal protection claim on the merits, finding this disparity
de minimis in light of the small percentage-I',4%-of school funding consisting of this in-
come. Id. at 296, 300-01 (noting an average spending per pupil of $1965.78 in the entire state
and spending in the various ChickasaA Cession school districts roughly consistent with spend-
ing outside the Cession).
119. Id. at 274.
120. Id. at 275.
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In an opinion written by Justice White, the Court attempted to ex-
plain the guiding force behind the permutations of Young. 121 The expla-
nation went as follows. Applicability of Young depends not on formal
categorizations but on federalism concerns: cases that "stretch [Young]
too far and would upset the balance of federal and state interest that it
embodies" fall outside of federal court jurisdiction. 22 Young's potential
to disrupt the balance of federalism, if applied too broadly, has led the
Court to "tailor" it narrowly, applying it only when it is "necessary to
permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state offi-
cials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.' "z123
This narrow tailoring has led the Court to restrict the Young fiction to
cases aimed at ending ongoing violations of federal law.' 2 4 Thus, when
faced with the task of deciding when Young applies, the Papasan major-
ity made its choice based on its assessment of the strength of the federal
interest involved in that case.
Just as the Green plaintiffs had tried to characterize notice relief as
genuinely prospective,1 25 the Papasan plaintiffs tried to make the relief
sought sound prospective even though their injury resulted from past ac-
tions-the ill-fated sale of land and investment in the railroads-that had
occurred in the distant past. Thus, they did not seek to hold the trustees
liable for a past breach of trust but to compel them to comply with their
ongoing obligation to pay income from the trust. 2 6 Finding this distinc-
tion too formal, since the "continuing payment of the income from the
lost corpus is essentially equivalent in economic terms to a one-time res-
toration of the lost corpus itself," the Court held that the case fell outside
of the ambit of Young. 127
Having set out its federalism concerns in detail, the Papasan Court
nevertheless failed to analyze the federal interest in particular. It did not
explain why, if federal law provided land to the state for the purpose of
121. Id. at 292 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 277.
123. Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)
(quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908))).
124. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). The
Court justified excluding past compensation that could have an effect on the future through its
deterrent value because this effect was too indirect to fit within the narrowly tailored federal-
ism concerns of Young. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
126. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279. Even this formal characterization had a serious deficiency:
could the trustees have an ongoing obligation to pay the income from the trust once they had
lost the corpus of the trust? Id. at 279 n.12. The Court, relying upon RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS, § 74 (1959), suggested that only an action for damages for past breach of
trust remained open to these plaintiffs. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279 n.12.
127. Id. at 281.
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promoting education, that purpose did not continue-indefinitely into the
future. If the income from the land stops, is there not a continuing -pro-
spective federal interest in restoring it? The plaintiffs sought payments in
the future that would further the specific goal-education-that led to
the federal law allegedly violated. 128 The Court compared the relief re-
quested to the past lost benefits in Edelman, 129 but in Edelman the Court
could say that equitable restitution of lost benefits would no longer serve
the day-to-day needs of the poor, for which Congress designed welfare,
and thus resembled mere compensation. The restored income in
Papasan, on the other hand, would provide future education, not com-
pensation for lost education. Therefore, the Court's reliance on Edelman
is unsatisfying.
Passing to the constitutional claim, the Papasan Court found no
eleventh amendment bar. Although the federal interest in creating a per-
petual trust through land grants for the benefit of the public schools did
not motivate the Court to indulge in the Young fiction, the Court re-
sponded differently to the asserted constitutional right under the four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause to a minimally adequate
education. 130 The Court saw the ongoing "unequal distribution by the
State of the Benefits of the State's school lands" as "precisely the type of
continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned
under Young."' 131 Although the same action in the past, the sale of the
land and the investment in the railroads, produced this ongoing alleged
violation, here, the remedy "would ensure compliance in the future with
a substantive federal-question determination."' 132
The Papasan Court cannot be accused of using fine distinctions to
mask policy-driven choices. The rejection of the trust claim had no ef-
fect on the outcome since the fourteenth amendment claim provided an
alternate ground for the relief requested. 133 The Court writes plainly and
128. Id. Cf Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (remedial action viewed as prospec-
tive relief).
129. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 280-81; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). To the extent
that they also sought past income lost and interest income, the comparison to Edelman is apt.
The inability to obtain all of the relief requested does not, however, undermine the federal
court's jurisdiction to award other relief. See id. at 281 n. 13.
130. Id. at 282.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) (quoting Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974))) (emphasis in original). For a suggestion that Milliken itself
may involve a prospective remedy for past violations, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21,
at 1192.
133. This assertion is true except to the extent that the trust claim may have more chance
of success on the merits than the fourteenth amendment claim.
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forthrightly about the determinative force of the federal interest. But
how do the two claims really vary in terms of federal interest? It could
be argued that Young only works when the condition persisting in the
future-disparity in school district income-is itself the violation of fed-
eral law. If plaintiffs complain of an existing condition that is merely the
result of a violation of federal law in the past, Young will elude them.
Thus, the federal interest needed to invoke Young could be limited to
ongoing compliance with federal law.
There is, however, another way of identifying the real federal inter-
est that moves the Court to invoke its legal fiction. The claim that war-
ranted the use of Young arose under the Constitution, while the rejected
claim was a matter of federal common law that more or less paralleled a
field of state law. Indeed, as this Article will elaborate, a distinction be-
tween constitutional and nonconstitutional law may underlie much of the
development of eleventh amendment doctrine. 34
C. The Exclusion of Claims Arising Under State Law
Another eleventh amendment case that explicitly uses a federal in-
terest analysis is Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 135
which presented the question whether the Young fiction would avoid the
defense of state immunity to claims based on state law. The state law
claim in Pennhurst found its way to the Supreme Court not through the
citizen-state diversity clause at issue in Chisholm, but because it arose out
of the same "nucleus of operative fact" as several federal question claims
that also were raised in the case.136 Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, employed a federal interest approach to ascertain the scope of Young.
He traced the Court's willingness to embrace what he openly called a
legal fiction to the important values it served: it "promote[d] the vindica-
tion of federal rights [and] the supremacy of federal law."'' 37 It thus
"harmonize[d] the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effec-
tive supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion." 38 When the claim comes from state law, Young would not serve
134. See infra text accompanying notes 221-76.
135. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). I have addressed Pennhurst in detail elsewhere. See Althouse,
supra note 18.
136. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117-18.
137. Id. at 105 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979)); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 (1952)).
138. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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those federal interests, according to Justice Powell, and therefore the
Court would not accept its application.1 39
Pennhurst directly identified the idea of federal interest as the deter-
minative factor in structuring eleventh amendment doctrine and rejected
the more formalistic reasoning suggested by Justice Stevens in dissent.140
Justice Stevens wrote in terms of the state officials acting beyond the
scope of authority extended to them by the state and the consequent fail-
ure of the state's immunity to flow to them, 14 1 language quite similar to
that used by the Young Court itself in justifying its result.142 One sus-
pects, however, that Justice Stevens too was motivated by his vision of
the federal system, even though he declined to phrase his written opinion
to directly concede this and spoke instead in the formalistic terms of the
concept of ultra vires. 143 The suggestion made in this Article that federal
interests determine the shape of eleventh amendment doctrine extends
beyond the written opinions that happen to concede as much.
Again, it is important to remember that even if all judges openly
followed a federal interest analysis, their conclusions would differ. As-
sessments of federal interest would vary. It is likely that Justices Stevens
maintained a different assessment of the federal interest at stake in
Pennhurst from Justice Powell's. Justice Powell's argument that the pur-
pose behind Young "disappeared" when the claim arose under state law
could have been countered with the argument that there was a strong
federal interest in the federal claims that the state law claim was pendent
139. Commentators have criticized this result. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective
Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdic-
tion in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REv. 343 (1985); Chemerinsky, State Sover-
eignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643 (1985); Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 129 (1987); Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial
Power to Reform Social Institutional, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 71 (1984); Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
140. 465 U.S. at 105-08. The majority seems to have realized that legal fictions are valua-
ble in part because one recognizes their falsity and thus focuses upon the purposes that moti-
vated them. See Fuller, supra note 57 at 363, 368-70. "A fiction taken seriously, i.e.,
'believed', becomes dangerous and loses its utility." Id. at 370.
141. 465 U.S. at 104-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1974).
143. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4668-69 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), Justice Stevens undertook a comprehensive review of eleventh amendment doc-
trine and concluded that Pennhurst, like many other cases, represented a balancing of federal
and state interests. He also indicated that he favors a different balance: "In my view, federal
courts 'have a primary obligation to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in
the Federal Constitution' and the laws, and generally should not eschew this responsibility
based on some diffuse, instrumental concern for state autonomy." Id. at 4669 (quoting Harris
v. Reed, 57 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4228 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
to and that to bar consolidation of related state claims in a single litiga-
tion would impair those federal claims. Indeed, uncertainties created by
abstention doctrines and even res judicata (should the state claim
brought in state court proceed to judgment before the federal claim)
could have been characterized as detracting from the federal interest in
enforcing the federal claims.144
In saying that Young "harmonize[d] the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured
elsewhere in the Constitution," the Court again evinced the belief that
the eleventh amendment must have some significant present force,1 4 5 im-
plying some ill-justified and ill-defined state interest in immunity. Fed-
eral interests may control the application of Young, but seemingly only
when they outweigh the supposed state interest. 146 But one might view
Pennhurst from a different perspective. Instead of saying Young only ap-
plies to the extent that it serves federal interests, one might say the states
can only claim sovereign immunity to the extent that immunity serves
federal interests. The state in Pennhurst gained immunity not simply be-
cause it was a state and because immunity must have some present force;
it received immunity because it had enacted statute that was directed at
curing the same ills addressed by federal law. In this situation, using
immunity as a reward to encourage states to create such alternatives to
federal remedies may promote federal interests. 147
D. Summary
A majority of the Supreme Court, having reaffirmed the initial
choice in Hans to extend eleventh amendment immunity to federal ques-
144. For a more detailed consideration of some of these issues raised in Pennhurst, see
Althouse, supra note 18, at 1517-25.
145. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105; see supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
146. For another case suggesting an eleventh amendment balancing test, see Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71 (1985). Cf Althouse, supra note 44, at 1083-90 (arguing that the
Court obscures the meaning of the Younger abstention doctrine by confusing what could be a
cogent federal interest analysis with notions of state interest).
147. Interpreted this way, Pennhurst reflects a functional approach. 465 U.S. at 89. The
federal system properly tolerates state separateness only when a state has taken an affirmative
step that serves the federal interest by creating an alternative remedy. By allowing the state to
retain exclusive jurisdiction over its legislative creations and empowering the states to attract
institutional litigation into their own courts, the Pennhurst doctrine gives states an incentive to
create new state law remedies aimed at improving their own institutions. A state that does not
take such affirmative steps will gain no immunity. A state that offers a pale substitute for
federal law will also invite federal court litigation, since plaintiffs need not initially pursue their
state remedies when they have the option to litigate in federal court relying solely on their
federal claims. The state can only realize the reward of separateness by convincing plaintiffs
that the state court remedy is preferable.
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tion suits, still recognizes the need for access to federal courts to vindi-
cate the supremacy of federal law. Consequently, it has had to find a way
to meet that need, using the Young fiction and at the same time restrict-
ing it, for Young without restriction would open the federal courts to all
federal question suits, despite Hans. One key device for restricting
Young has been the retrospective-prospective distinction. As shown
above, that distinction does not depend on a realistic analysis of whether
the individual defendants named in accordance with Young actually will
fund any relief granted by the federal court. Instead, it represents an as-
sessment of the strength of the federal interest in making the federal
courts available to provide the requested relief. Because a majority of the
Court has found the federal interest strong enough only when there is an
ongoing violation of federal law, it has created the retrospective-prospec-
tive distinction and has groped, in Papasan, toward a distinction between
prospective injunction that remedies past violations and prospective relief
from ongoing violations of federal law. The second major limitation of
Young is the exclusion of pendent state law claims, seen first in
Pennhurst. There, too, a conclusion about federal interest determined
the scope of state immunity.
If the Court's distinctions depend on individual judicial assessments
of federal interest, litigants may enhance their arguments by demonstrat-
ing that the federal interests at stake in cases are in fact broader or
stronger than what the majority has in the past recognized. It remains
speculative, however, whether individual Justices would have varied
their doctrinal choices in response to arguments that concentrated more
on the strength of the federal interest and less on formalistically logical
or fictional matters. A different assessment of the federal interest in past
relief 48 might have produced an opposite result in Edelman. A different
assessment of the federal interest in pendent state law claims 49 could
have produced an opposite result in Pennhurst.
This Article introduces a new possibility: the predominance of the
interest in federal constitutional law over all other kinds of law that
might be asserted against the states. 150 To see the validity of this new
distinction, it is necessary to understand the special power that Congress
possesses with regard to the eleventh amendment.
148. See supra text accompanying note 88.
149. See supra text accompanying note 144.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 221-76.
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III. Congressional Power over the Eleventh Amendment
Unlike Young and the recent eleventh amendment cases discussed
above, the broad premises of Hans v. Louisiana do not measure up to
federal interest analysis. Limited to its particular factual setting-a suit
to force the state to pay its war debts'15 '-Hans may have lacked a suffi-
cient federal interest to warrant any creativity in designing a doctrine to
pull the case into federal court. But Hans did much more: it took the
distinctly limited language of the eleventh amendment and conjured up
an entirely new dimension in which it could operate, excluding all federal
question cases without regard to the plaintiffs' citizenship. If the Hans
question were to arise for the first time before the current Supreme
Court, it is doubtful whether the Court would stretch to devise this ex-
traliteral interpretation, which runs counter to the strong federal interest
in a federal forum for suits against states that violate federal law. Yet,
because the precedent is so well established, it is unlikely that the Court
will overturn Hans unless it sees the case as seriously detrimental to fed-
eral interests. 52 Hans lays the foundation for eleventh amendment doc-
trine, but much of the later doctrine was designed to mitigate its negative
effects on federal interests.
Given the century of post-Hans case law, several members of the
Court do not see it as posing a severe threat to federal interests. 153 States
that violate federal law cannot avoid suit entirely under existing law. As
discussed above, federal suits for prospective relief remain available. 54
Plaintiffs also may obtain relief, including past relief, if local government
agencies, such as municipalities or school boards, are defendants, since
the Court has restricted the eleventh amendment to the states and their
agents. 5 5 In addition, plaintiffs can reach the assets of individual de-
151. To the extent that Hans represented virtually the same fact pattern as Chisholm-
repudiation of war debts, transformed into a federal law violation through the use of the con-
tracts clause-the most satisfying answer may be that there is no private right of action for
damages under that constitutional provision. Hans itself could have avoided subjecting states
to federal court jurisdiction in exacting payment of war debts by rejecting the substantive law
theory that the debts were also actionable under federal constitutional law. In that case, there
would be no need to recognize a broad immunity covering federal questions in general. The
suit simply would fail to state a claim. See supra note 19.
152. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2970
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the effect of Hans "pernicious").
153. Id. at 2953.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 72-88.
155. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436
U.S. 658 (1978)). This limitation is particularly striking if one considers that National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which used the tenth amendment to immunize cities from federal
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fendants for damages if they are personally liable and official immunity
does not bar relief.156 Ironically, the years of chipping away at Hans
have added staying power to the case. Hans' persistence guarantees the
complexity of eleventh amendment case law, but, as mentioned earlier,
the majority tolerates that complexity as the cost of maintaining some
"present force" for the amendment. 157
The most significant additional consideration affecting the endur-
ance of the embattled precedent is congressional power. Ordinarily, con-
stitutional decisions put an end to any interplay between the Court and
the legislature, introducing a stagnation that only the Court can cor-
rect. 158 Because of this stagnation, stare decisis has a weaker force in
constitutional cases. 159 This section of the Article considers Congress'
power over eleventh amendment matters, which, because it too mitigates
the harsher effects of Hans, provides the majority with an additional rea-
son to leave precedent alone. Based on an understanding of this power
and an acknowledgment that Hans continues to appeal to a majority of
the Court, the final section proposes a revision of eleventh amendment
substantive liability, made no distinction between cities and states in discussing federalism
concerns. Nor did Garcia make such a distinction in overruling National League of Cities.
156. See supra notes 46 & 74. Thus, though individual officials have limited assets, they
are often indemnified by their employers. Though they may not be named as defendants, the
states often pay for past relief. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 280 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57
U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), however,
suggests the emergence of a new, extreme pro-Hans position, that does not rest on tolerance of
complexity. Responding to a further complexity created by the four anti-Hans justices (trans-
formed into a majority with the addition of Justice White), Justice Scalia wrote, "[I]nstead of
cleaning up the allegedly muddled Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produced by Hans, the
Court leaves that in place, and adds to the clutter." Id. at 4677. According to Justice Scalia,
the case law is "unstable" and "at war with itself." Id. Justice Scalia thus views complexity as
a problem, not a benign manifestation of the tensions of federalism. He predicts, "[W]e shall
either overrule Hans ... or return to its genuine meaning." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4672. Justice
Scalia does not elaborate upon this notion of the "genuine meaning" of Hans, though it is clear
that it does not include congressional power to abrogate immunity under the commerce clause,
the precise issue in Union Gas, discussed infra text accompanying notes 161-86. His call for
simplification suggests the potential for attack on some of the other complicating doctrines
discussed in the previous section of the Article.
Since three justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy) joined Justice Scalia's opinion
and four justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) disapprove of Hans, it may be
that only Justice White continues to believe in the moderate pro-Hans approach articulated by
Justice Powell in recent years. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
158. See, eg., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 11 (1982).
159. See, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 715 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
doctrine, without overruling Hans, that reflects federal interests more ac-
curately than does the present arrangement.
A. The Power of Congress to Abrogate State Immunity
Two years after Edelman v. Jordan barred use of the Young fiction
to pursue retrospective relief in federal court, the Court opened up an
entirely new area of eleventh amendment doctrine. Though the Court
perceived the need for careful tailoring of the legal fiction it created in
Young, it took a different view of an attempt by Congress to subject the
states to suit in federal court. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 160 the Court unani-
mously held that Congress could abrogate state immunity, at least when
it acted under its fourteenth amendment enforcement power.
This past term, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 161 five mem-
bers of the Court joined together to hold that Congress also has the
power to abrogate immunity under the commerce clause 62 and presuma-
bly under all of its Article I powers. 63 The unanimity broke down over
the question of whether the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment gives Congress a greater power against the states than do its other
powers. Justice Rehnquist had written earlier, in Fitzpatrick, that section
five of the fourteenth amendment "expressly granted [Congress] author-
ity to enforce 'by appropriate legislation' the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limita-
tions on state authority."' 64 Justice Scalia, writing for the four members
160. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
161. 57 U.S.L.W. 4662 (1989).
162. Id. at 4665-67 (Brennan, J., joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens).
Justice Brennan frames the issue in commerce clause terms and his reasoning relies in part on
the particular importance of the commerce power. Nevertheless, most of his reasoning would
also apply to other congressional powers.
163. Id. at 4668-69 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 4672 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). For a discussion of Justice Stevens' reasoning, based on the notion that
Hans is merely a judge made doctrine, see supra note 48.
164. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. Justice Rehnquist also wrote, "We think that Congress
may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation,' for the purpose of enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id. at 456. It has been argued that
the language implying limitation to the fourteenth amendment related only to the need to
overcome the restrictions on congressional power imposed by National League of Cities and to
permit abrogation even in core areas of state activity. See Field, supra note 6, at 1228. If so,
legislation based on other powers, even during the reign of National League of Cities, could
have survived the Fitzpatrick Court's restriction as long as it fell outside of those core areas.
Thus, if only there had been the necessary explicit statement of abrogation in Parden v. Termi-
nal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (operation of railroad), or Welch
(operation of ferry), Congress could have abrogated immunity without constitutional
problems.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
August 1989] FEDERAL INTERESTS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1159
of the Court in Union Gas, emphasized that the "Fourteenth Amend-
ment... was avowedly directed at the power of the States."' 165 On the
other hand, Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, saw no basis for
viewing the fourteenth amendment as an " 'ultraplenary' grant of author-
ity" simply because it contains a separate section giving Congress power
to enforce its substantive provisions. 16 6 According to Justice Brennan,
all constitutional grants of power to Congress automatically detract from
the states' power. 167
Both sides in Union Gas assessed the federal interests at stake, osten-
sibly as a way of determining what the Constitution must mean. Justice
Brennan emphasized that some problems, such as the environmental
harm caused by hazardous waste disposal at issue in Union Gas, can only
be solved on a national scale by the federal government. 68 Moreover,
sometimes the states will be significant participants in these problems (for
example, the states own and operate many hazardous waste sites), and
the needed solutions may demand a private cause of action for money
damages in order "to be satisfactory."1 69 Because of these needs, accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, "the commerce power must include the power to
hold the States financially accountable."1 70 That is, federal interests sup-
ported the creation of a doctrine allowing the expansion of federal
jurisdiction.
Similarly, Justice Scalia asserted that "the Constitution envisions
the necessary judicial means to assure compliance with the Constitution
and laws,"17 1 and that therefore some inroads into state immunity were
"'inherent in the constitutional plan.' "172 But although he noted the
"inherent necessity" for suits brought by the United States and by other
states against states in federal court, he did not share Justice Brennan's
165. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4676. Justice Scalia also argued that the fourteenth amendment is
different from Article I powers because, unlike Article I, it postdates the eleventh amendment.
Id. Justice Brennan astutely pointed out that under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the sover-
eign immunity, it preceded the Constitution, and therefore all of the Article I powers, like the
fourteenth amendment, postdate the concept of sovereign immunity. Id. at 4666.
166. Id. (referring to the enforcement clause, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5). Justice
White provided the fifth vote in support of congressional abrogation but did not elaborate his
reasons other than to state his lack of support for the plurality's reasoning. Id. at 4672 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 4666 (citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) ("[E]very addition of
power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of governmental powers
of the States. It is carved out of them.")).
168. See id. at 4667.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 4674.
172. Id. at 4673 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934)).
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assessment of the need for suits brought by private individuals. 173 In
discounting the need for the kind of private suits made possible by con-
gressional abrogation, he relied on the ability of private individuals to sue
state officials for prospective relief and, under section 1983, to sue them
personally for damages and to sue local government units for damages. 174
Put in the terms of this Article, Justice Scalia saw the existing forms of
jurisdiction as sufficient to meet federal interests and thus rejected an
expansion of jurisdiction as unjustified by federal interests.
How can Congress give the federal courts a type of jurisdiction ex-
cluded from the definition of "judicial power" in Article III? 17 5 It is
elementary that Article III describes the potential reach of federal court
jurisdiction and that Congress, which the Constitution gave the choice
whether to create lower federal courts at all, has control over how much
of that judicial power to give. 176 Thus, the Article III limits on judicial
power also are necessarily limits on Congress' power to confer jurisdic-
tion. As mentioned earlier, 177 the eleventh amendment is directed at Ar-
ticle III and limits how it may be construed. It can be argued that the
ability of Congress to subject the states to suits in federal court, as well as
the long-recognized ability of the states themselves to consent to suit in
federal court, 178 demonstrates the fallacy of Hans. According to this ar-
gument sovereign immunity cannot implicitly limit the categories of ju-
risdiction contained in Article III if consent to jurisdiction is possible,
173. Id. at 4674.
174. Id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Compare supra text accompanying notes 154-57 (noting
that this complex doctrine makes Hans more acceptable) with supra note 157 (citing evidence
of Justice Scalia's dissatisfaction with complex doctrine).
175. See Union Gas, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4675 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Sur-
vived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
Ion, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 367-68 (1985).
176. C. WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 32-39.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 13.
178. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900). Just as the Court stresses the clarity
with which Congress must state its intent to subject the state to suit, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 187-94, the Court will not find that a state has waived its immunity unless it makes a
clear statement. In both instances, it is not enough to express the intent to make the states
subject to suit (that is, to make the state liable). There must be a specific intent to make the
state suable in federal court. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985). In
Atascadero, the plaintiffs argued, in addition to the point considered in the text of the Article,
that Art. III, § 5, of the California Constitution waived eleventh amendment immunity. Id.
That section, which the Supreme Court held insufficiently explicit, provided: "Suits may be
brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." Id.
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since the consent of the defendant cannot create subject matter
jurisdiction.17 9
Although Justice Brennan, and all of the justices that joined him in
Union Gas except Justice White, consider Hans incorrect,180 Justice
Brennan does attempt to square plenary congressional power to abrogate
with Hans. His reasoning is as follows: Eleventh amendment immunity
excludes only suits that the state has not consented to.' 8 ' Consented-to
suits do fall within the judicial power defined in Article III, as indicated
by the longstanding acceptance of suits that the states themselves have
explicitly consented to.182 In ratifying the Constitution, the states have
consented in advance to any suits that Congress might choose to subject
them to, so long as Congress acts pursuant to one of its Article I pow-
ers.183 "States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus
not 'unconsenting;' they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the
Constitution... rather than on a case by case basis."' 8I 4 Seen this way,
the states do not consent to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, their
ratification of congressional power has caused cases to fall into one of the
categories of permissible jurisdiction defined by Article III: Consented-
to federal question cases. 185 This justification for abrogation may seem
somewhat tortuous. Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote, "The suggestion that
this is the kind of consent our cases had in mind when reciting the famil-
iar phrase, 'the States may not be sued without their consent,' does not
warrant response."' I8 6 Perhaps Justice Brennan's notion of consent
179. See HART & WECHSLER supra note 21, at 1213 (noting the state's ability to consent
to suits against it in federal court and asking, "Is this an anomaly (however well-established) in
light of the ordinary rule that the parties lack power to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts?").
180. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4676-77 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia considers the congressional abroga-
tion doctrine so unreasonable that it can only make sense to those who would simply prefer to
overrule Hans. Id He cannot account for Justice White's acceptance of both Hans and ple-
nary congressional abrogation power. Id at 4675. Since Justice White does not attempt to
explain his concurrence with Justice Brennan's Union Gas opinion, id. at 4672, there is no
written explanation of the abrogation power by a judge that would also uphold Hans.
181. Id. at 4667 (citing Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("[T]he entire judi-
cial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought




185. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 145-46 (1980); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1429 (1975). Contra Marshall, supra note 65, at 1348.
186. Union Gas, at 4675. It should be noted that although Justice Stevens provided the
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through ratification is best characterized as another fiction, designed to
make a desirable power-this time congressional-fit into the existing
framework.
In developing the congressional abrogation doctrine, the Court has
required an express statement of intent to overcome state immunity.
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 187 took this trend to its current ex-
treme. The plaintiffs in that case sought to establish that Congress in-
tended to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity by enacting
the Rehabilitation Act.1 88 Rejecting the plaintiffs' attempt to demon-
strate congressional intent by using legislative history and "inferences
from general statutory language," 189 the Court limited Congress to a sin-
gle form of expression: it must "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute."' 90
Congress' subsequent amendment of the Rehabilitation Act' 91 pro-
viding the requisite clear statement may shed some light on the Atas-
cadero rule.' 92 Either the Court's strict rule led it to mistake
congressional intent and thus ought to be abandoned, or the strict rule
has functioned well in teaching Congress how to abrogate immunity ef-
fectively. 193 If Congress retains this lesson and from now on systemati-
fifth vote in favor of abrogation and did join in Justice Brennan's opinion, his concurring
opinion only accepts the power of Congress to subject the states to suits that are not within the
reach of eleventh amendment immunity, though he would limit that constitutional immunity
to citizen-state diversity cases. See id. at 4668. Thus, it would seem that only three (or perhaps
four, depending on Justice White's unarticulated position, see supra note 180) justices believe
the consent rationale articulated by Justice Brennan. For a further discussion of Justice Ste-
vens opinion, see supra note 48.
187. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
188. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 31-796 (1973).
189. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
190. Id. The lack of a citation for this limitation indicates its novelty. See also Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (relying on legislative history to find congressional intent to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity). Prior to Atascadero, the established requirement
was that "Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
bar to suits against the States in federal court." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (citing Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45).
191. Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000d-7 (West Supp. 1987)).
192. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme
Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URBAN LAW. 301, 326-27 (1988).
193. Indeed, Congress' show of how well it learned its lesson risked heightening the stan-
dard of what "unmistakably clear" statutory language is. Congress' amendment of the Reha-
bilitation Act explicitly referred to the eleventh amendment, a fact referred to by Justice White
in his Union Gas opinion. See Pennsylvanaia v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672 n.7
(1989) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White, who was joined in
this portion of his opinion by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, "would
not go so far" as to require an explicit reference to the eleventh amendment, but he did note
that the language at issue in Union Gas suffered by comparison to the language used to over-
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cally focuses on the immunity issue, by drafting an express statutory
provision when it chooses to abrogate, the restrictiveness of Atascadero
will only matter to those who want the courts to find broader abrogation
than Congress intends and with respect to statutes written prior to Atas-
cadero. It is not unlikely, however, that after Atascadero, Congress sim-
ply focused on the narrow problem of effectuating the Rehabilitation
Act. If so, it will not necessarily approach future legislation with the
Court's drafting lesson foremost in mind. 194
B. The Constructive Waiver Theory and Its Demise
Until recently there also had been a theory of constructive waiver, a
creature of judicial imagination premised on an odd mix of state and
congressional action. In Welch v. State Department of Public Highways
& Public Transportation, 195 this theory met its demise. The Supreme
Court faced the question whether a state may be sued under the Jones
Act, which gives "seamen"' 196 injured in the course of their employment
a federal claim against their employers and explicitly states that federal
come Atascadero. Id. A majority of the Court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
and Scalia), however, exhibited greater leniency in its search for "unmistakably clear" statu-
tory language, piecing together the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act-of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, in order to reach its conclu-
sion. See id. at 4663-65 (Brennan, J.); id. at 4672-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Indeed, the notion of "unmistakability" loses quite a bit of force with the
admission, "surely judges can disagree about the content and rigor of the standard of 'unmis-
takable clarity.'" Id. at 4664 n.2 (plurality). But see Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720
(1989) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, J.J.) (applying
strict standard of "unmistakable clarity"). Moreover, Justice Scalia, writing for himself alone,
completely rejects the task of looking for congressional intent in the statutory language, on the
ground that "Members of Congress ... need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to
be both lawful and effective." Union Gas, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4673 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia's rigid textualism here may seem inconsistent with his
extraliteral interpretation of the eleventh amendment. Compare id. (looking only to the "fair
and reasonable meaning of the text" of the abrogating statute) with id. (rejecting an interpreta-
tion of the eleventh amendment based solely on its text and looking instead to the background
understandings of the adopters of the Constitution). But his view that legislation may well
represent no intent at all certainly squares with the view of those justices who would overrule
Garcia: they contend that Congress does not automatically consider and protect the interests
of the states as that case asserts. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. A rejection of
Garcia is quite consistent with a rejection of congressional power to abrogate immunity. See id.
194. But see infra discussion in text accompanying notes 266-69. Unless Congress bears in
mind the issue of overcoming eleventh amendment immunity, it has not carried out its func-
tion of representing the states' interests, and courts thus ought not find eleventh amendment
abrogation.
195. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
196. The Welch plaintiff was a female dockworker, but no one questioned that the Jones
Act covered her. Id. at 2961 n.6.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
courts may hear these claims. 197 Although the statute does not name the
states as possible defendants, it is conceivable that the employer could be
a state.
The legal question in Welch was similar to that in Parden v. Termi-
nal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, 198 which consid-
ered whether an employee injured by a state-operated railroad could sue
the state in federal court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA).199 Like the Jones Act, the FELA authorized suit in federal
court against defendants that could include the state if the state hap-
pened to engage in the injury-causing activity. Like the Jones Act, the
FELA omitted any specific reference to the state. This omission pre-
cluded the use of the doctrine of congressional abrogation developed in
Fitzpatrick and Atascadero. But in Parden the Court had staked out a
more complex doctrine to find consent to suit when both Congress and
the state had taken some limited action suggesting waiver, though neither
had gone far enough to overcome sovereign immunity. Justice Brennan,
writing for the Parden majority, reasoned that Congress "meant what it
said" when it wrote a statute subjecting interstate railroads to suit in
federal court.20 0 Thus, if a state operated a railroad, the FELA covered
it.201 Moreover, Congress had the constitutional power to impose this
liability on the states under the commerce clause.20 2 Finally, recognizing
that "a State may not be sued by an individual without its consent, '20 3 he
found the necessary consent in the state's entry into the railroad business
after the enactment of the FELA, by which "Congress conditioned the
right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to
suit in federal court as provided by the Act." 2°4 That is, the act of oper-
197. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West 1975).
198. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
199. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1908).
200. Parden v. Terminal Ry of the Ala. State Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).
201. Id. at 187-90. In an inversion of Atascadero's clear-statement rule, Justice Brennan
wrote that the state is included unless there is "an express provision to the contrary." Id. at
190.
202. Id. at 190-92. In fact, Justice Brennan implies at this point that the statute alone,
without the addition of the constructive waiver step described in the text, results in a waiver.
See also id. at 193-94 n. 11. As explained above, this aspect of Parden died long ago: Congress
must specifically name the states to waive immunity for them. See infra text accompanying
notes 187-94. In Parden, four justices (White, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart) dissented on the
ground that Congress had to subject the state to suit explicitly-proposing the clear-statement
rule and opining that "Congress did not even consider the possible impact of its legislation
upon state immunity from suits." Id. at 199.
203. Id. at 192.
204. Id.
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ating a railroad constituted acceptance of the condition supposedly laid
down by Congress, and hence a constructive waiver of immunity.20 5
As the Court's requirement of a clear statement of congressional
intent to abrogate immunity grew increasingly stringent over the years,
Parden seemed more and mbre out of place. Unlike the congressional
abrogation cases that looked narrowly at Congress' stated intent, the
Parden doctrine was a judicial leap of imagination, capable of overcom-
ing the lack of a direct abrogation of state immunity. The elements mak-
ing up a waiver did not point toward the state's intent to consent to
suit.20 6 A state does not enter into the railroad business as a way of
expressing consent to suit in federal court. Nor is there any reason to
think that Congress, in passing the FELA, meant to lay down a condi-
tion alerting the states that operating a railroad constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity. Thus, one might fairly call Parden-like Young-a
legal fiction.20 7
Later cases limited Parden by emphasizing the need for clarity in
Congress' expression of the condition.20 8 With newfound respect for the
states' immunity, the Court began to view waiver as a "surrender of con-
stitutional rights," that ought to be treated the way the Court would
treat the waiver of a constitutional right by an individual. 20 9 Accord-
ingly, the Court stressed the state's awareness of the condition, its reali-
zation that taking a particular action would constitute waiver, and the
voluntariness of taking the action.210 For example, if the state sought to
205. Id.
206. See Field, supra note 6, at 1215.
207. For an argument that Hans is also a legal fiction see supra text accompanying notes
58-63.
208. In an article written before Welch, Professor Brown wrote that the inquiries for con-
gressional abrogation and state waiver had become the same, though with different purposes,
to "ensuref] that Congress knew what it was doing" and to ensure "that the state knows what
it is getting into," respectively. Brown, supra note 139, at 388.
209. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) ("Constructive consent is not a doctrine
commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights.") See also Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973). Justice Douglas, who joined the dissenting opinion in Parden, which criticized the
majority for not requiring a clear statement of intent to condition entry in to the railroad
business on consent to suit in federal court, wrote for the majority in Employees: "It is not
easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown
to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity
they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution." Id. at 285.
210. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 279, 293-98 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See
also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation
of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 692 (1976). Profes-
sor Tribe questions Justice Marshall's assumptions on the ground that they impose unconstitu-
tional conditions: "[I]fstates have a right under article III and the eleventh amendment not to
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provide some traditional service to its citizens, as opposed to entering a
nontraditional business, the Court would hesitate to find waiver. 21'
After all of this constriction of Parden, Welch may have been little
more than a delayed death announcement. If Congress gave enough
thought to making the states subject to suit in federal court that it man-
aged to compose a sufficiently clear statement of the condition, one
would think it would simply go on to make the explicit "Atascadero
statement" that would avoid the need to find an additional act of waiver
by the state. It is difficult to imagine Congress, either intentionally or
unwittingly, writing a clear statement that would serve as a predicate for
constructive waiver but would not work as a direct abrogation, independ-
ent of any additional act by the state. A statute only would do the for-
mer without also doing the latter if it expressly rendered a state subject to
suit in federal court as a condition of engaging in a particular activity.
But even then, Parden seems extraneous. Such a provision would occur
in a statute imposing liability for some activity conducted in violation of
federal law. The state could not face that substantive liability unless it
had undertaken the activity regulated by federal law. Whenever the pos-
sibility of a lawsuit under the statute existed, the state would have en-
gaged in the activity that the federal court could read as constituting
be subjected to unconsented suits in federal court, then it would seem that Congress lacks the
power to condition even their subsequent entry into various activities upon state forfeiture of
that right, however knowing and voluntary." Id. at 692. This problem inheres in the con-
structive waiver doctrine of Parden, where the state's act constitutes the consent to suit. See
also Field, supra note 6, at 1216-17 (suggesting the conditioning is acceptable because of the
"nexus between the privilege granted and the demanded waiver"). Presumably, the problem is
avoided when Congress directly imposes suit on the state, as in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976), since no conditioning occurs. The act that constitutes consent is taken by Con-
gress and not coerced from the state. This is an oddly formal distinction. In either case the
susceptibility to suit occurs because the state engages in the regulated activity. See supra text
accompanying note 12.
211. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 279. In Employees, the Court wrote,
Where employees in state institutions not conducted for profit have such a relation to
interstate commerce that national policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates
that their status should be raised, Congress can act. And when Congress does act, it
may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States. Congress, acting
responsibly, would not be presumed to take such action silently. The dramatic cir-
cumstances of the Parden case, which involved rather isolated state activity can be
put to one side. We deal here with problems that may well implicate elevator opera-
tors, janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office
building in a State's governmental hierarchy.
Id. at 284-85. Concurring, Justice Marshall distinguished these proprietary and governmental
state functions in a different way, producing the same result. Traditional state functions would
tend to precede the enactment of a statute expressing the condition. According to Justice
Marshall, the Court should not construe the activity as a waiver; waiver should not flow from
the mere continuation of the activity or the failure to cease it. Id. at 296-97.
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waiver. The state would never find itself in the position of a defendant in
a FELA case in the first place if it had not entered into the railroad
business as Alabama did in Parden.2 12
Justice Brennan, who Wrote Parden, subsequently incorporated
Parden into his general thesis of eleventh amendment interpretation. 213
For him, Parden indicated that the states gave up their sovereignty with
respect to any area in which Congress received power. Thus, if Congress
creates a cause of action that can be asserted against a state, a lawsuit
may be brought as a simple matter of federal question jurisdiction. 214
Under Justice Brennan's later elaboration, not only could the Court
cease to look for an act by the state that might constitute waiver, but it
would not even need to look for a statement by Congress that it intended
to subject the state to suit in federal court. As long as Congress created
substantive liability that could apply to a state, no immunity problem
would exist. Of course, this is another way of saying the Court should
reject Hans.
In Welch, the Supreme Court majority buried Parden with very lit-
tle ceremony. After finding the suit barred because the Jones Act lacked
a clear statement of intent to abrogate as required by Atascadero,21 5 the
Court stated that no other route to finding the state suable in federal
court existed.21 6 It brushed aside Parden as a virtual nullity, based on
the misinterpretation of earlier cases and simply disregarded by later
cases. 217 Interestingly enough, the very next section of its opinion, the
majority, answering Justice Brennan's call to overrule Hans, also went on
to sing the praises of stare decisis. 218 This variable respect for precedent
is not particularly surprising. Stare decisis always has some force; the
real issue is whether a justice will perceive sufficient reason to overcome
it on a given occasion. The majority felt sufficient motivation to overrule
Parden but not Hans. The minority was ready to overrule Hans, but,
212. 377 U.S. at 184. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672, 4676
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the insignificance of the
waiver step, given that substantive law only applies to those who "engage in the activity or
hold the status that produces liability"). It should be noted that the roundabout Parden analy-
sis did serve one key purpose: it allowed the federal courts to avoid the question of whether
Congress can abrogate the states' immunity using constitutional provisions other than the
fourteenth amendment, a question that the Supreme Court left unresolved until this Term's
Union Gas decision. Id.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 7-22.
214. Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184, 192
(1964).
215. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Rd. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2947 (1987).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2948.
218. Id. at 2948-49.
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failing that, would have retained Parden, which mitigates Hans at least to
a degree. The majority in Welch characterized the precedent it rejected
as a misguided deviation from earlier cases, eroded by later cases. 21 9 Yet
precisely the same argument could be made for overruling Hans: there
are earlier eleventh amendment cases that Hans arguably deviates
from,220 and later cases, such as Young, that reduce much of its force.
C. Summary
By requiring plaintiffs to name individual state officials and not the
state itself as a defendant, the Young doctrine disguises the reality that
state action in violation of federal law deprives the state of its immunity.
Loss of the states' immunity, as an involuntary result of its action and in
the absence of express consent, is nonetheless the effect of that doctrine.
Beyond the Young doctrine, however, the Court carefully guards against
involuntary or constructive waiver- express consent by Congress is con-
sidered a crucial element. Under Young, the Court is willing to piece
together an admitted fiction to impose liability on the states. Under Atas-
cadero and Welch, immunity prevails unless the clearest congressional
statements dictate otherwise. The theoretical break between the congres-
sional abrogation cases, on the one hand and Young and its progeny on
the other, brings a disturbing incoherence to eleventh amendment case
law. One way to integrate these two divergent lines of thought without
rejecting either Hans or Young is to distinguish immunity under constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional law. The next section of the Article pro-
poses using this distinction to restructure eleventh amendment doctrine
and contrasts this change with overruling Hans.
IV. A Proposed Distinction Between Constitutional and
Nonconstitutional Law
A. Moving Beyond Young's Constitutional Law Limitation
Parden created a device that permitted federal courts to grant com-
pensation for past injuries based on federal statutory law, even though
Congress failed to abrogate the state's immunity expressly and even
though the prospective-retrospective distinction precluded the use of
Young. This new creation, constructive waiver, would only work, how-
ever, in cases based on federal statutes. It depended on express statutory
219. Id. at 2948.
220. This argument is made in great detail in J. ORTH, supra note 6, at 222-28. For a
contrary argument, finding that the cases cited by Professor Orth actually comport with Hans,
see Collins, supra note 50, at 222-27.
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language that a federal court could construe as notifying the states that
their entrance into a particular activity would constitute waiver of elev-
enth amendment immunity. Conversely, constructive waiver could never
take place in cases based on a violation of constitutional law.221 Oddly,
then, the Parden doctrine reflected an inversion of the usual order of
priority: constitutional cases generally present the most compelling de-
mand for relief in federal courts. 222
Indeed, in Young, it was the need to provide a federal forum for the
enforcement of federal constitutional law that led the Court to evade the
full force of Hans by creating a legal fiction. The discussion of federal
law in the text of Young itself is restricted to constitutional law, as is the
oft-quoted passage of Young that sets forth its doctrine:
The act [the challenged state statute] to be enforced is alleged to be
unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a pro-
ceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the
State in its sovereign or governmental capacity .... If the act.., be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under
such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representa-
tive character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. 223
There is no mention here of nonconstitutional federal law, such as
the statutes and regulations permitted to invoke the Young fiction in later
cases. 224 For example, in Edelman the plaintiffs charged the state de-
221. Conceivably, however, Congress could write a general statute that would abrogate
state immunity for all federal question cases or all constitutional cases. It has been argued,
though unsuccessfully, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is such a statute. See infra note 267. In rejecting
this argument, the Court has not disaffirmed Congress' power to make such a general abroga-
tion. Instead, it has relied on the statutory interpretation that Congress directed § 1983
against individuals acting under color of law and not against the states themselves. See Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
222. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293 n.8 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (not-
ing the "strange hierarchy that would provide greater opportunity to enforce congressionally
created rights than constitutionally guaranteed rights in federal court"). Professor Field, how-
ever, writes that the hierarchy makes sense if the policy of the eleventh amendment is to limit
the judiciary and not Congress, though she finds no textual or historical support for this pol-
icy. Field, supra note 6, at 1256-58. She goes on to write that without any such support, it is
"strange" to permit statutes but not constitutional provisions to overcome state immunity. Id.
at 1260-61.
223. Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
224.: See, e.g., Worchester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). In that case, the
Court notes that eleventh amendment immunity is overcome "when the action sought to be
restrained is without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of
the United States." Id. at 297. The Court did not discuss why Young extends beyond the
constitutional context presented, and moreover, it assumed Young applies to violations of state
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fendants with failing to comply with federal administrative regulations,
yet the Court concentrated entirely on making the retrospective-prospec-
tive distinction to limit the scope of Young. 225 It quoted the Young pas-
sage above containing the textual limitation to constitutional law, and
then accepted without discussion that Young permits federal courts to
adjudicate the claim for prospective injunctive relief.226 Since Justice
Douglas, in dissent, mentioned the issue,227 we may assume the Court
was not oblivious, but rather decided to ignore the discrepancy.
The Court's silence seems to confirm the federal interest analysis
that this Article describes in section II. The federal interest in federal
statutory and regulatory law may have seemed so strong that no discus-
sion of the Young expansion was even needed.
Despite the difficulty of quoting Young and applying it in nonconsti-
tutional settings, this logical gap attracts little judicial attention. 22 8 Most
law, a premise now directly contravened by Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). See also Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (eleventh amendment
bars prospective injunction unless state official is "alleged to be acting contrary to federal law
or against the authority of state law").
225. For a discussion of Edelman, see supra text accompanying notes 72-88.
226. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1974). The plaintiffs alleged that in addi-
tion to violating the federal regulations under the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled pro-
gram, the failure to process some applications for aid within the prescribed time violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. Id. at 653 n.1. This footnote refers to
pendent jurisdiction, but not as a means of overcoming the eleventh amendment problems:
pendent jurisdiction overcame the requirement existing at that time that the claim exceed some
jurisdictional amount for claims governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but not for civil rights claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)). The use of pen-
dent jurisdiction to overcome an eleventh amendment bar is questionable after Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). For federalism reasons, that case barred
the use of pendent jurisdiction to file state law claims against state officials in federal court. Id.
at 122-30. Federalism concerns, however, would have a different impact on a federal statutory
claim linked to a federal constitutional claim.
227. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 679. Justice Douglas found that, because the plaintiffs also
pursued a fourteenth amendment claim, the case fell within Young. Id. at 680.
228. Two able research assistants painstakingly combed the lower court case law through
mid-1987 and found only one case that directly addressed the issue and discussed it at any
length, Great Lakes Inter-Tribal Council, Inc. v. Voigt, 309 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Wis. 1970). In
that case Judge Doyle analyzed the alleged violation of a federal treaty by a state statute apply-
ing fish and game restrictions to Indians and equated the importance of the federal law at issue
with constitutional law. He also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to characterize the suit as
founded on constitutional law simply because it was urged that a state statute conflicted with
federal law and thus was void under the supremacy clause, citing Supreme Court precedent
established in the context of the former requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 that a three judge
court hear cases seeking an injunction on the ground that a state statute violated the Constitu-
tion. See id. at 62-63 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965)).
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courts have assumed Young applies whenever there is a violation of any
federal law.229
B. Why Treat Federal Constitutional Law Differently?
Significant differences between federal statutory and constitutional
law justify different treatment under the eleventh amendment. Specifi-
cally, a federal statute necessarily has received the attention of Congress.
As explained in the previous section,230 Congress has the power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity when it deems access to federal court a
desirable aspect of the statutory enforcement. 231 But the provisions of
the Constitution have not received this attention, nor are they part of a
detailed scheme that is expected to spell out remedies. The Constitution
sets forth guarantees in outline form, and, consequently, the federal
courts have taken on a fairly expansive role in supplying the detail
needed to give meaning to those skeletal provisions. 232  Notably, the
229. For a typical example of the way courts make the logical leap, see Frye v. Lukehard,
361 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. Va. 1973). The Supreme Court once mentioned the issue in a
footnote, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 435 U.S. 151, 156-57 n.6 (1978). Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Pennhurst, a case in which the majority made much of the need to control any
expansion of the Young fiction, drew attention to that earlier statement and asked why the
Court had made so little of expanding Young in Ray. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 137 n.13 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 135-47. Justice Stevens thought that the application of Young to violations of state
law, at issue in Pennhurst, deserved the same offhand acceptance. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 137
n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Quite the opposite of Pennhurst-in which the Court was able to
assert, rightly or wrongly, that there is no federal interest in hearing a claim based on state law
in federal court, id. at 106 (Stevens, J., dissenting)-in Edelman, the federal interest in federal
statutory law must have appeared so strong that the Court allowed an expansive reading of
Young to pass almost unnoticed.
Language in Pennhurst indicates that the Court equates federal statutory and constitu-
tional law. Justice Powell, even as he hemmed in Young, affirmed its necessity to "promote the
vindication of federal rights" and the "supremacy of federal law." Id. at 105. In these words,
there is ample room to include federal statutory law within the federal interest that Young was
designed to preserve, though Justice Powell elsewhere characterizes the Young fiction as neces-
sary to "harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of
rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Id. (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part)). It could be
argued that the phrase "powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution refers to the power to
make statutes, thus making this language also support the extension of the Young fiction to
statutory law.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 160-94.
231. On the power of Congress to abrogate under article I powers other than the com-
merce clause, see supra, text accompanying note 163.
232. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (finding implied cause of action
under Constitution). The Davis Court wrote,
Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely appro-
priate for Congress, in creating these rights and obligations, to determine in addition
who may enforce them and in what manner. For example, statutory rights and obli-
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courts elaborate the remedies available when constitutional rights are vi-
olated. 233 Thus, resolution of conflicts between sovereign immunity and
federal constitutional rights forms a natural part of the judicial role. The
Court played out that role in Young. The subsequent extension of Young
to nonconstitutional cases shifted this appropriate and desirable judicial
activism to congressional creations, possibly giving them an unintended
remedial reach.
Concerns about this overextension may have found expression in the
Edelman Court's exclusion of retrospective relief from Young treatment.
The desire not to exceed its proper role and overextend the reach of stat-
utes (and regulations enforcing statutes, such as those involved in
Edelman) may have led to the prospective-retrospective distinction. This
distinction, however, has the additional effect of curtailing remedies for
constitutional violations, where there is no need to be concerned about
overextension of statutory remedies and where the Court's role in defin-
ing remedies is highly desirable.
A distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional law
would reorganize doctrine in a way that would affirm the Court's role in
the area of constitutional law and would retain Congress' dominance
over the remedial scope of its own statutes. If Young only governed con-
stitutional law cases, the exclusion of claims for past relief, developed in
the context of claims under federal regulations, could be eliminated.
Plaintiffs could then pursue all forms of relief available under the Consti-
tution, as a matter of judge-made law. On the other hand, courts then
would cease to use devices of their own creation to bring federal noncon-
stitutional claims into federal court, as indeed they have already done
with respect to state claims. 234 Congress would retain exclusive control
gations are often embedded in complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not
enforced through private causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, or other public causes of ac-
tions ....
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal
code." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). It speaks instead with a
majestic simplicity. One of "its important objects," is the designation of rights. And
in "its great outlines," the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means
through which these rights may be enforced.
Id. (citations omitted).
233. Davis, 442 U.S. at 241-42.
234. See discussion of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, supra text accompa-
nying notes 135-47. A similar phenomenon occurred in Papasan v. Alain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
The Court declined to use Young to allow a claim based on federal common law into federal
court. See supra text accompanying notes 112-34. Papasan is, however, oddly out of keeping
with an institutional understanding of the court's role since there is no congressional assess-
ment of federal interest in remedies to defer to. See infra text accompanying notes 236-43.
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over the question of access to federal court in cases based on federal stat-
utes and other nonconstitutional law, though courts would still need to
determine whether a given statute in fact authorizes federal
jurisdiction.235
This is a novel and perhaps unsettling proposal, at least to those
steeped in- eleventh amendment law and committed either to the existing
doctrinal framework or to overruling Hans. But let us examine it fur-
ther, using a federal interest approach. The case of Ex Parte Young itself
represented judicial lawmaking designed to enforce constitutional rights.
The Court recognized the need for a remedy, 23 6 but also the importance
of access to a federal trial court.237 The Court found a way, through the
creation of a legal fiction, to provide that access. But when federal statu-
tory law forms the basis of a case, no equivalent need for judicial activism
to protect and further federal interests exists. When Congress has al-
ready had the occasion to consider the procedures needed to support the
rights it has created and has neglected to make the state suable in federal
court, it is hard to find any federal interest capable of motivating the
Court to provide what Congress has omitted.
The federal interest in vindicating constitutional rights is independ-
ent of any action taken by Congress to enforce them. Congress' indiffer-
ence or hostility to constitutional rights does nothing to impair the
federal courts' role in enforcing those rights. If anything, the courts' ac-
tivism ought to increase in the absence of congressional attention to those
rights.238 But contrary considerations take hold when federal statutory
rights form the basis of a claim. The federal courts could not have cre-
235. The clear-statement rule of Atascadero is an example of the court's performing this
interpretational function. It is important to note in connection with the proposal made here
that if Young were withdrawn from claims arising under nonconstitutional law, Atascadero
may not necessarily apply to requests for prospective relief which currently may be heard
pursuant to Young. For an argument that it should not, see infra text accompanying notes
244-46.
236. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-68 (1908), is the well-spring of case law concern-
ing the existence of private rights to sue that are implicit in the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400-03 & n.3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
237. In Young, Justice Harlan urged unsuccessfully that plaintiffs could assert their consti-
tutional rights as defenses in state law cases brought to enforce the offending state statute.
Young, 209 U.S. at 161-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In this view of federalism, the federal
interest in accurate and uniform interpretation of federal law would be served by eventual
Supreme Court review. Id. at 176. Thus, we may see Young as a recognition of the impor-
tance of federal judicial participation at the trial level.
238. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398, 402-06 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing role of
courts in area of constitutional law because it is"aimed predominantly at restraining the Gov-
ernment as an instrument of the popular will.") Id. at 404.
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ated those substantive statutory rights if the legislature had taken no in-
terest in them. Moreover, those statutory rights exist only to the extent
dictated by Congress. The procedures accompanying statutory rights de-
fine their dimension. Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision for
federal jurisdiction over state defendants, there is no reason to indulge in
a legal fiction to find jurisdiction.
If the Court's determination of the precise bounds of federal juris-
diction depends on an assessment of federal interests, when it looks at
statutory law the Court should not ignore inclusions and omissions in the
statute. A congressional failure to abrogate the states' immunity repre-
sents an assessment of the federal interest in access to federal court to
enforce a particular statute against a state; an assessment made by the
institution in the best position to know the nature and extent of that
interest. If the Court refrains from creating jurisdiction-expanding doc-
trine when Congress has not imposed jurisdiction, the Court is essentially
accepting Congress' assessment of the federal interest at stake. This pro-
cess of deferring to Congress' role is similar to the position the Court has
taken in tenth amendment analysis with respect to provisions of federal
substantive law that have an impact on the states. In Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,239 the Court recognized that
Congress plays a crucial role in preserving the residual sovereignty of the
states. It conceived of that role as exclusive of any supplemental judicial
function in protecting the states from intrusion, which federal courts had
previously carried out in the name of the tenth amendment. Garcia
rested on the assumption that Congress is the institution best structured
to protect the interests of the states in relation to the federal interests
239. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. X). Garcia relies heavily on
the thesis proffered by Professor Wechsler in, Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Professor Wechsler thought that the structure of the Senate and
the state control of House districting created a Congress "intrinsically well-adapted to retard-
ing or restraining new intrusions by the [central government] on the domain of the states." Id.
at 558. The Supreme Court, in his view, is on weak ground when it purports to protect state
interests after Congress has taken a particular action, since Congress' action represents a more
authoritative assessment of state interests and a judgment that they are outweighed by federal
interests. Id. at 559. Wechsler's position has been challenged, most notably by Justice Powell,
dissenting in Garcia. Justice Powell argued that the national government is isolated from the
states and influenced by other, stronger interests groups. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568-72, 576-77.
Wechsler's theory, however, is not based on the belief that the states need to lobby Congress
actively. Rather, he thought Congress would naturally be inclined to protect state interests.
Wechsler, supra, at 558. See Lee, supra note 192. Lee details several examples of Congress'
responding to Supreme Court cases affecting state or local government, including Atascadero.
She argues that Congress views federal legislation from the perspective of federal policy, not as
representatives of the states. Id. at 334-35.
[Vol. 40
August 1989] FEDERAL INTERESTS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1175
furthered by congressional legislation. 24° Given the process of balancing
state and federal interests that takes place in the legislative setting, judi-
cial tinkering under the tenth amendment could only place more weight
on the state interest side of the scale. Since Congress, if it has passed
substantive legislation affecting the states, has already determined that
federal interests outweigh state interests, a judicial role under the tenth
amendment would only replace Congress' determination with that of the
Court. 2 4 1
Under the eleventh amendment a similar process occurs. When the
Court uses a legal fiction to make it possible to sue the state under a
federal statute, it substitutes its own valuation of federal interests for the
one reflected in the statute. If the Court uses a legal fiction to take what
Congress has declined to give, it ought also to engage in some kind of
balancing of state interests. Yet, to do so would suspiciously resemble
the tenth amendment scrutiny it abandoned in Garcia.242 The proposal
made in this section, on the other hand, regards Congress' weighing of
state and federal interests as definitive. If a statute fails to abrogate the
states' immunity, it evinces the solicitude for the states that the framers
expected from Congress in exercising its powers and that Garcia af-
firmed. The Court has chosen to entrust Congress with the function of
protecting the states' tenth amendment interests. Likewise, it must treat
Congress' decision whether to abrogate immunity as final. 243
240. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (noting specifically the states' indirect control over the
House and equal representation in the Senate).
241. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1128. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W.
4662, 4668, 4669 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Garcia and justifying congressional
abrogation on the ground that "Congress is not superseding a constitutional provision in these
cases, but rather is setting aside the Court's assessment of the extent to which the use of
constitutionally prescribed federal authority is prudent"). It should be noted that two mem-
bers of the present Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, strongly disagree
with Garcia's conclusion that Congress is structured to protect the interests of the states. See
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Rehnquist, and O'Connor, as
well as Chief Justice Burger); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Not surprisingly, both of these justices rejected the expansion of Congress' power
to abrogate beyond the fourteenth amendment. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57
U.S.L.W. 4662, 4672 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, as well as Justice Kennedy).
242. Cf Field, supra note 6, at 1218-21 (prior to Garcia, expressing concern that National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), might impose some limits on congressional
power to abrogate immunity).
243. Members of the Court inclined to overrule Garcia, should not reach a different result.
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). If Garcia were overruled, the federal courts would resume active policing of statutes
that impose burdens on the state. It would not increase scrutiny of legislation that shields the
states from burdens, such as the kind of legislation that fails to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity.
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C. Congressional Abrogation and Prospective Relief
A shift to a conceptual framework that refers solely to congressional
intent with respect to federal statutory law would demand a reexamina-
tion of the Atascadero requirement that Congress expressly state its in-
tent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in the language of the
statute itself. The Court designed this requirement to prevent federal
courts from finding implied rights to retrospective relief under statutes or
regulations that offered explicit forms of relief.244 Provision of these ex-
plicit remedies suggests that Congress intended to maintain control over
the types of remedies available. When these remedies specify their inclu-
sion of states, one can infer that Congress has performed the role de-
scribed in Garcia of guarding against excessive burdens on the states.
These congressional attempts to tailor the remedial component of legisla-
tion deserve respect and should not attract possibly unwanted judicial
accretions that may upset a delicate balance sought by Congress.2 4 5
Different considerations come into play, however, with respect to
claims for declaratory or prospective injunctive relief. In awarding those
forms of relief, federal courts are simply elaborating the meaning of stat-
utes and requiring what statutes always require-that their prescriptions
be followed. These forms of relief do not impose burdens beyond the
precise intent of Congress or intrude on the states in a manner that may
be inconsistent with protection that Congress may have meant to pro-
vide, pursuant to the role articulated in Garcia. For these reasons, the
Atascadero level of scrutiny, which is arguably excessive in any event,2 46
should not apply to determinations of whether the federal courts can give
prospective relief. In the absence of any statement to the contrary, stat-
utes imply the abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity in claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus, if the Court were to accept the
proposal made here and withdraw nonconstitutional cases from Young's
scope, cases for prospective relief still should fall within federal court
jurisdiction, as a matter of congressional abrogation.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 230-34.
245. But see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In Atascadero, Justice Blackmun, who wrote the Garcia opinion and whose doctri-
nal shift undid the five member National League, 426 U.S. at 833, majority, saw Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), as suffering from the same defect as National League. He wrote
that Hans, like National League, "in derogation of otherwise unquestioned congressional
power, gave broad scope to circumscribed language by reference to principles of federalism
said to inform that language." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 303. For a discussion of the consis-
tency between Garcia and the Court's eleventh amendment doctrine, see Brown, supra note
175, at 388-89.
246. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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D. How Does a Constitutional-Nonconstitutional Framework Differ From
Overruling Hans?
In the end, because it retains full availability of prospective relief
under nonconstitutional law while also opening up constitutional law to
all forms of relief, the practical result of this proposal may differ little
from a decision to overturn Hans. The major difference, under the pro-
posal, other than avoidance of the drastic gesture of overthrowing long-
established precedent, is the retention of the Edelman restriction barring
retrospective relief for violations of federal nonconstitutional law that do
not contain clear provisions permitting that particular form of relief
against the states.247 As discussed above, federal interests justify en-
abling Congress to control the remedies that flow from its statutory cre-
ations and to perform its Garcia function of protecting the states from
undesirable burdens. 248
Yet, if the Court were to overrule Hans, it might seek ways to avoid
forcing unintended remedies, which could undermine Congress' role of
protecting state interests and which otherwise might inhibit congres-
sional action.249 If the Court did so, the similarity between overruling
Hans and accepting the doctrinal shift proposed here would be even
greater. There are two types of cases to consider if the Court overruled
Hans: the Welch type of case in which federal legislation provides a spe-
cific remedy, such as past damages, but shows no sign that Congress
thought about its application to the states; and the Edelman type of case
in which the legislation clearly targeted the state but failed to provide the
remedy sought.
I With respect to the Welch type of case, the Court would have re-
course to the tenth amendment. Overruling Hans would open the courts
to many more cases against the states than we have seen thus far, cases
particularly likely to disturb judges because they would directly name the
states, not merely state officials or local entities such as cities or counties.
Nor would those statutes contain the kind of explicit evidence of intent
to include states that is present in the abrogating statutes the courts are
accustomed to hearing. Even those members of the Court inclined to
believe that Congress is responsive to the interests of the states may
247. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-67 (1974).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 238-46.
249. See also Collins, supra note 50, at 245 (discussing how hostility to Hans has resulted
in mitigating doctrines); Field, supra note 6, at 1265-68 (suggesting no pre-eleventh amend-
ment constitutional provision can alter common law state immunity). For an argument that
Congress alone should resolve practical federalism problems, noting the potential that the
nonpolitical judiciary might erect inappropriately rigid principles of federalism, see Nowak,
supra note 185, at 1441.
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doubt whether any level of consideration of state interests has occurred
when statutes like the Jones Act or the FELA happen to find application
to the states.250 Given that some members of the Court have consistently
mistrusted Congress' representation of state interests, overruling Hans
might revive interest in tenth amendment analysis. Alternatively, the
Court could read an implicit exclusion of suits against the states into
these statutes. 251
With respect to the Edelman type of case, involving a federal statute
that does not explicitly provide a private cause of action, it is not enough
to suggest that the courts would avoid finding implied private rights of
action for damages under federal statutes. Section 1983 offers a federal
cause of action to private individuals for any violation of federal law-
constitutional or statutory252-by state officials. Without the eleventh
amendment restriction in statutory cases, any legislation binding the
state to federal standards could give rise to a federal cause of action
against an official acting for the state. To avoid this result, Congress
would need to show an intent to disallow the section 1983 action. 2 53 Re-
cently, however, the Court has indicated that remedial structures deemed
"sufficiently comprehensive" imply the needed intent.254 Because of sec-
tion 1983, if Hans were overruled, states might actually bear a greater
burden than other defendants covered by federal legislation that is silent
on remedies, for when federal statutory claims are asserted against pri-
vate defendants or federal officials and section 1983 does not apply, the
Court has carefully restricted the availability of remedies that are not
250. On the other hand, the kinds of statutes that fail to focus on the potential for applica-
tion to the states, like the Jones Act and the FELA, are more likely to deal with matters that
fall outside of traditional state functions. Under National League of Cities, states conducting
nontraditional state activities did not receive tenth amendment protection. National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
251. See Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 418-19 (suggesting that Congress ought to note its inclusion
of states explicitly and to make specific findings regarding the effect on state interests as part of
the process of enacting substantive legislation that has an impact on the states); Comment, The
Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1657, 1681 (1987) (authored by Thomas Odom) (suggesting that substantive statutes should
bear explicit statements of effect on states as tenth amendment requirement).
252. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
253. Given the instability of present § 1983 case law, it is difficult to predict the result of
overruling Hans. No doubt it would create further pressure for change. For a discussion of
Thiboutot and the problems it has raised, see Brown, Whither Thiboutot?: Section 1983, Pri-
vate Enforcement, and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 31 (1983); Sunstein,
Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982).
254. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
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expressly provided by federal statutes. 255 It no longer finds implied rem-
edies for damages without congressional intent to provide those reme-
dies.256 When a federal statute provides a remedial structure that does
not include private actions for damages, the Court is very unlikely to find
them implied.257 If Hans were overruled, then the Court, seeking to treat
state defendants more like other defendants, might begin to find an im-
plicit intent to exclude causes of action under Section 1983 in statutes
directed against states. Of course, requiring express causes of action
leads back to the same problem we now face under Hans in asking
whether Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity.
It may be reasonable, however, to assume that after overruling Hans
the Court would not attempt to cut off the resulting new claims against
the states. If thig assumption holds, the proposal made in this Article
would differ from overruling Hans in retaining the eleventh amendment
bar of nonconstitutional claims for retrospective relief 2 58 Yet this differ-
ence is not as great as it may at first seem given Congress' power in this
255. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (emphasizing need to
find congressional intent to create private causes of action). Even more strict, and indeed
reminiscent of Atascadero's approach to statutes, is Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion.
He notes that Congress ought to be explicit and warns that "this Court in the future should be
extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legisla-
tive Branch." Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcot-
ics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (existence of alternate remedy created by Congress is a
"special factor counselling hesitation" to find an implied cause of action in a constitutional
provision); Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of
Action, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1251, 1268 (1988) (arguing for implied right of action under the
Constitution unless statutes "provide effective remedies or, perhaps, when Congress has clearly
stated its intent to preclude those actions").
256. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
257. See Schweiker v. Chelicky, 56 U.S.L.W. 4767, 4770 (1988).
258. Overruling Hans would leave open the issue raised in Pennhurst. See supra text ac-
companying notes 135-47. If the states subjected themselves, in 1787, to suit by delegating
substantive powers to Congress, thus making immunity inapplicable in federal question cases
(the position that overruling Hans would validate), it would take a further leap of interpreta-
tion to reach state law cases. One could say that if federal jurisdiction extends to a case arising
under federal law, that jurisdiction applies to the entire case, subject only to the federal court's
exercise of discretion to send the state claim to state court under certain circumstances. This is
the pendent jurisdiction argument which relies on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966). The Court, however, rejected that logic in Pennhurst, when the federal court had
jurisdiction under Young to grant prospective relief based on federal law. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) Pendent jurisdiction, according to the
Court, could not overcome immunity that barred the state law claim. Id. at 120. It is hard to
see why overruling Hans would change that: it would give jurisdiction over federal claims,
without resort to Young and without the limitation to prospective relief. With regard to Pen-
nhurst situation, it would change only the reason for the court's jurisdiction over the federal
claims. Moreover, even if pendent jurisdiction were sufficient to bring state law claims within
the federal court's jurisdiction, federalism concerns are among the factors federal courts con-
sider in exercising their discretion over whether to hear the claim. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-
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area. Indeed, we may characterize the difference between this Article's
proposed reframing of existing case law and overruling Hans as a matter
of choosing a presumption.
Under current doctrine, Edelman provides that Young's fiction does
not apply to claims for retrospective relief, unless Congress takes the step
of abrogating eleventh amendment immunity. 259 Similarly, under the
doctrinal revision suggested in this Article, those claims would be imper-
missible, unless Congress has abrogated state immunity, because Young
would not affect nonconstitutional cases. If Hans were overruled, how-
ever, those claims would be permissible unless Congress disallowed them,
because no state immunity would remain. Section 1983 would supply the
needed cause of action against state officials, whether or not the particu-
lar statute authorized the desired form of relief. The fundamental ques-
tion is whether the federal courts should hear claims for retrospective
relief against the states based on federal statutes when Congress has not
cut off the right of action sought. Under the Article's proposal (as well
as under present law), the answer is no; if Hans is overruled, the answer
is yes.2 6 0
E. What Does Congress Intend by Silence?: Some Thoughts on Justice
Scalia's Welch Opinion
As noted above, the Court generally views constitutional questions
as less strongly bound by precedent than statutory ones. 261 This diver-
gent treatment stems from the Court's unique ability to alter its constitu-
tional interpretations and, on the other hand, Congress' ability to amend
statutes to reassert its control over their meaning. If the Courts' statu-
27. These factors could move federal courts to decline jurisdiction without regard for the elev-
enth amendment.
Overruling Hans might not rest solely on the theory that federal question cases fall be-
yond the reach of the eleventh amendment. See Marshall, supra note 65, at 1346. It is also
possible to base a rejection of Hans on a literal reading of the text of the amendment. In that
case, the amendment only limits the federal court's jurisdiction over cases brought by nonci-
tizens of a state and thus state law claims brought against the plaintiffs' own state could come
within court's pendent jurisdiction. Still, a federal court could base a rejection of jurisdiction
on federalism concerns as a matter of discretion following Gibbs.
259. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-67 (1974).
260. The difference here is slight in view of the Court's willingness to interpret "suffi-
ciently comprehensive" statutory remedies as indicative of congressional intent to make the
§ 1983 cause of action unavailable. See supra text accompanying notes 252-57. Although Atas-
cadero requires a clear statement that the state may be sued in federal court, Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1984), the case law does not require that a statute contain a
clear statement to exclude the use of § 1983 as a remedial device. Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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tory interpretation remains unmodified by Congress, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress acquiesces in the interpretation or, at least, does
not actively or strongly disagree. 262 The eleventh amendment, though a
constitutional provision, interacts with numerous statutes that raise the
possibility of suits against the states in federal court. In Welch, Justice
Scalia focused on this point, writing that for "nearly a century... Con-
gress has enacted many statutes ... on the assumption that States were
immune from suits by individuals," thus making it unreasonable sud-
denly to "interpret the statutes as though the assumption never ex-
isted. '263  These concerns about untoward effects on statutory
interpretation and the resulting burdens of revision that would fall on
Congress if the Court were to overrule Hans led Justice Scalia to rest his
concurrence on considerations of stare decisis.2M
The problem of disrupting the meaning of statutes- presents another
reason to consider making the distinction between constitutional and
statutory claims under the eleventh amendment. Yet, the problem does
not necessarily foreclose the possibility of discarding Hans. Justice
Scalia's concern only involves existing statutes, not statutes that Con-
gress might enact in the future nor constitutional provisions. The Court
could address the problem by overruling Hans but interpreting statutes
that predate the overruling in their proper context. That is, the Court
could find that when Congress enacted these statutes, it assumed that the
mere existence of a cause of action that could be asserted against states
would not suffice to subject them to suit in federal court unless the stat-
ute contained an express statement to that effect.- Congress had the
power to disallow a private cause of action against the.states as a matter
of substantive law and might have seen fit to exercise that power if it had
any reason to think the eleventh amendment did not already bar the suit.
Accordingly, the Court could interpret all Hans-era statutes that lack an
explicit statement subjecting the state to suit to contain an implicit
exclusion. 265
262. One should not read too much into Congress' failure to keep track of its old statutes.
See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 158, at 1-7. The Court tends to base its interpretation on
the intent of the Congress that enacted the statute. A different Congress, with different pre-
vailing majorities and policy goals, often will have succeeded the enacting Congress. The sig-
nificance of the later legislature's inaction is more questionable. The point remains, however,
that Congress does have the power to amend the statute but not to change the Constitution,
short of the exacting constitutional amendment process.
263. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987).
264. These same considerations played a part in Justice Scalia's ultimate decision to ad-
here to Hans. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4662, 4674 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. This limited form of overruling would differ little from the constitutional-nonconsti-
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But has Congress over the years relied on the immunizing conse-
quences of Hans? This question is virtually the same as the issue of what
presumption-immunity or no immunity-ought to apply when Con-
gress has not acted. Although present case law directs the presumption
of immunity in the face of inaction, it is possible that Congress has not
intended that effect, as indeed its post-A tascadero behavior shows.266
Even without overruling Hans, the Court could dispense with the clear-
statement rule, and broadly read abrogation into all statutes that might
be asserted against states. 267 Justice Scalia's concern rests on the belief
that Congress has relied on the Court's presumption of immunity. But if
Congress has not realized in enacting legislation applicable to the states
that its failure to address the issue explicitly would result in state immu-
nity barring claims for retrospective relief in federal court, then there has
tutional distinction proposed. See supra text accompanying notes 221-46. The extent of actual
difference would depend on whether Congress, after Atascadero, will consistently address the
immunity issue and express its intent to abrogate in clear statutory language, and whether, if
there is a limited overruling of Hans, Congress perceives the potential for litigation against the
state and expresses clearly any intent to exclude the state. See supra text accompanying notes
191-94.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
267. Some of the language in Parden takes this approach. See supra note 202. One prob-
lem with this alternative is that it makes it is easier to bring statutory claims than constitu-
tional claims, unless § 1983, which provides a statutory cause of action for violations of federal
law including constitutional law is also viewed as abrogating, contrary to the Court's ruling in
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). On two occasions, at different stages of the
Edelman litigation, the Court considered whether § 1983 abrogated the state's immunity. Id.
at 345; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676-77 (1974). The majority's finding of no abroga-
tion is now plainly compelled under Atascadero's requirement of an explicit statement of intent
to subject the state to suit: § 1983 only refers to "persons" and not specifically the states them-
selves, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1984). See also Nowak, supra note
185, at 1465-68 (historical evidence that § 1983 does not abrogate state immunity); Wolcher,
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts
for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 210 (1981) (the effect of § 1983 is so great
that the courts should hesitate to apply it to the states). If the Court were to construe § 1983
as a congressional abrogation of immunity, then the states through their officials would be
subject to awards of all forms of relief available under federal law. This is because § 1983
provides a cause of action for violations of federal law carried out under color of state law.
This finding would have gone a long way toward making the retrospective-prospective distinc-
tion obsolete. Under the proposal made in this Article, § 1983 claims based on constitutional
law would gain access to federal court, not through a finding of congressional abrogation, but
under the Young fiction, shorn of its remedial limitations. But plaintiffs asserting statutory
rights would need to look exclusively to the statutes that provide the rights they assert and not
to § 1983. The Edelman litigation, in which the Court made its decision that § 1983 was a
nonabrogating statute, dealt with violations of federal regulations that provided explicit reme-
dies. The plaintiffs were using § 1983 as a supplement to the remedies provided along with
their substantive rights. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675-77. The situation is quite different when
plaintiffs employ § 1983 as a vehicle for the assertion of constitutional rights. In that event,
§ 1983 provides the primary remedial means, and the legitimacy of judicial activism is far
stronger.
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been no reliance. Congress might instead have wrongly assumed that
any statute creating a claim that might be asserted against a state will
subject the state to suit in federal court, though only statutes that ex-
pressly name the states as objects of suit currently do so. 268 If Congress
has wrongly assumed this, then the existing presumption thwarts con-
gressional intent, and Justice Scalia's reservations about overruling Hans
are groundless.
To overrule Hans now would be to embrace the presumption that
Congress intends to make the states suable whenever it enacts a statute
creating a right that might be asserted against a state, regardless of
whether it meets the present standard for abrogation. In the area of stat-
utory cases, we may view overruling Hans as a mere substitution of an
alternate presumption, given Congress' power to exclude the states from
suit. If Hans were overruled, and it turned out that Congress disagreed
with this new presumption, it would then need to make the explicit ex-
clusions that now are unnecessary because the opposite presumption-
that silence means immunity-holds sway.
If state immunity in the face of federal legislation surfaced as an
important value in the wake of a shift in the Court's presumption, Con-
gress would not need to propose another constitutional amendment, as it
did after Chisholm, 269 to express its disagreement. Congress would need
only to remedy the relevant statutory silences with explicit provisions
excluding states from federal jurisdiction. It might undertake a compre-
hensive review of existing statutes, or it might wait until individual cases
using silent statutes against the states came to light in the federal courts
and address these on a piecemeal basis. Obviously, it would take some
effort to counteract the new presumption, but under the current law it
takes effort to overcome immunity. Congress must exert some positive
effort to rebut whichever presumption about immunity the Court estab-
lishes. So, again, the fundamental issue involves the Court's choice of a
presumption.
H. Choosing a Presumption: Overrule Hans?
What presumption of congressional intent ought to govern statutory
claims that may be asserted against states? The particular role of Con-
gress in representing state interests has a strong bearing on this question.
A presumption of immunity tends to ensure that Congress has gone
through the process of considering the interests of the states in passing
268. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
269. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see supra note 11.
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legislation that will subject them to suit in federal court.270 Abrogation
of immunity does not occur under the present doctrinal framework with-
out explicit legislative intent to do so; a simple default by Congress in
performing its role does not sacrifice the states' interest in avoiding bur-
densome lawsuits. 271 Even if we accept the theory that Congress is struc-
tured to protect the interests of the states, it is still problematic to find an
intent to include the states as potential defendants whenever a statute
gives rise to a right of action that might be asserted against them. For
example, when Congress enacted the railroad regulation at issue in
Parden2 72 or the shipping regulation in Welch, 273 the potential applica-
tion to the states was too remote to permit the inference that Congress
had functioned to protect the states' interests. The recent rejection of the
constructive waiver theory in Welch emphasizes the need for a connec-
tion between abrogation and legislative awareness of the potential impact
on the state. In other cases, statutes that do not meet the current stan-
dard for abrogation may have obvious enough potential for application to
the states to support the conclusion that Congress has performed its role.
Even after Atascadero, a statute that explicitly covers the states subjects
them to federal jurisdiction, despite the eleventh amendment.2 74 A shift
to a presumption against immunity- overturning Hans-would sacrifice
the assurance that Congress had indeed fulfilled its function of consider-
ing state interests in creating new statutory obligations. 275 The eleventh
amendment would no longer provide any immunity when a federal stat-
ute could be asserted against the state, even if Congress had shown no
sign of having considered the effect on the states. Though Congress
could, once the application became apparent, act affirmatively to amend
a statute to exclude the states as a matter of substantive law, the states
270. But see Lee, supra note 192, at 326-33 (showing state's lack of opportunity to affect
legislation containing explicit provisions affecting state).
271. Cf Comment, supra note 251, at 1685 (arguing that under tenth amendment there
should be rule of construction that congressional silence signifies lack of intent to affect the
states).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 198-205.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
274. Note that even if Atascadero went too far at the time in assuming Congress did not
intend abrogation, its prospective application is much sounder. It makes more sense to inter-
pret statutes enacted after Atascadero that fail to make an explicit statement as nonabrogating
because Congress may rely on Atascadero and assume that it need not make a specific exclu-
sion for the states when it does not mean to abrogate. This is similar to the reliance issue that
Justice Scalia raised in Welch. See supra text accompanying notes 261-65.
275. The only area remaining for the federal court protection of states is in interpreting
legislation to determine whether Congress intends to include the states-unless the Supreme
Court resumes tenth amendment scrutiny or restricts the applicability of § 1983, a possibility
suggested above. See supra text accompanying notes 249-58.
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would not have any guarantee that congressional consideration of their
interests would precede their subjection to jurisdiction.
Retaining the basic doctrinal structure, with the shift to the consti-
tutional-nonconstitutional distinction suggested in this Article, would
preserve for the states this one guarantee. Perhaps this is the "present
force" for the eleventh amendment that current federalism considera-
tions justify.276
Conclusion
Ideas about federal interests, not historical interpretation, have
shaped eleventh amendment doctrine, though historical justifications
have quickly followed, clouding the written opinions. This Article has
shown how the federal interest in the articulation and enforcement of
federal law has affected doctrinal developments and has brought to light
many of the Supreme Court's own concessions of the determinative effect
of federal interest. This Article has attempted to illuminate a wide range
of eleventh amendment doctrine, while making no effort to disguise the
high degree of free play found in decisionmaking based on an assessment
of federal interests. The aim here is to bring federal interest analysis into
the open and to describe its possible uses.
The Article also has shown some of the areas where present eleventh
amendment doctrine is vulnerable, where federal interest analysis sug-
gests a turn in a different direction. The primary example given here of a
new direction permitted by straightforward federal interest analysis is a
distinction between federal constitutional and nonconstitutional law, a
distinction that recognizes the particular importance of locating constitu-
tional cases in federal court. It is not suggested that this restructuring of
the existing doctrinal framework is necessarily superior to the often-pro-
posed alternative of overruling Hans and completely rejecting the elev-
enth amendment's application to federal question cases. As section V of
this Article shows, the comparison of those two changes involves ex-
tremely complex, interrelated questions about the power of Congress, the
significance of statutory silences, and the capacity of Congress to protect
the interests of the states. Ultimately, this Article sheds a different light
on these and other eleventh amendment questions, and indeed, more gen-
erally, on the ongoing interaction between the states and the federal
courts and between Congress and the federal courts.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.

